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Disguised Sales Between Partners and Partnerships:
Section 707 and the Forthcoming Regulations
KAREN C. BURKE*

INTRODUCTION

In classifying transactions between a partner and a partnership for federal
income tax purposes, it is important to determine whether the partner is

acting in his capacity as a partner or as an unrelated party. In general, a
bona fide sale or exchange of property between a partner and a partnership
is treated as a transaction between unrelated parties under section 707(a)(1)
of the Internal Revenue Code,' subject to certain limitations. 2 Classification

of such transactions raises conceptual problems, however, because the relationship between the partner and the partnership is often ambiguous. Until
recently, partners were often able to avoid sale or exchange treatment by
structuring transactions as a tax-free section 721 contribution followed or
preceded by a tax-free section 731 distribution from the partnership.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Act),- Congress adopted a statutory
3
approach to the problem of "disguised sales" by enacting section 707(a)(2)(B).
Congress was concerned that existing regulations and case law failed to
prevent deferral or avoidance of tax on transactions which closely resembled

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. LL.M. (Taxation), 1985, Boston
University; J.D., 1982, Stanford University Law School; PH.D. (History), 1979, M.A., 1975,
Harvard University; B.A., 1972, Smith College. The author would like to thank William D.
Andrews at Harvard Law School and colleagues at the University of Minnesota Law School
for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The author is also grateful to James D. Bryce of
the American Journal of Tax Policy for his thoughtful suggestions concerning revision of the
manuscript from a policy-oriented perspective.
1. I.R.C. § 707 (1986) (unless otherwise indicated, all Internal Revenue Code references
are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as currently amended). Section 707(a)(1) provides
generally that "if a partner engages in a transaction other than in his capacity as a member
of such partnership, the transaction shall... be considered as occurring between the partnership
and one who is not a partner." Id. § 707(a)(1) (1986). See also id. § 707(a)(2)(A), (B) (1986)
(added by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 73, 98 Stat. 494, 591 [hereinafter
1984 Act], and amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1805(b), 100
Stat. 2085, 2810 [hereinafter 1986 Act]).
2. Explicit statutory limitations on section 707(a) are set forth in section 707(b), as amended
by the 1986 Act, § 642(a), 100 Stat. at 2283. Section 707(b)(1) disallows recognition of losses
on sales between partners and controlled partnerships or between controlled partnerships, and
section 707(b)(2) treats as ordinary income gain realized on certain sales between partners and
controlled partnerships or between controlled partnerships. I.R.C. § 707(b) (1986).
3. Section 707(a)(2)(B) provides that transactions which are "properly characterized as a
sale or exchange" will be treated as occurring between the partnership and a non-partner or
between two or more partners acting in their capacity other than as partners. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B)
(1986). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3) (1987) (codified in
I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (1986)).
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sales of property or partnership interests. 4 Under section 707(a)(2)(B), nonpartner treatment may apply to a transaction in which property is transferred
to a partnership and the transferor or another partner receives property or
other consideration from the partnership contemporaneously with, or shortly
after, the transfer.5 If section 707(a)(2)(B) applies, the transaction will be
treated as a sale or as a part-sale, part-contribution.
Although Congress granted broad legislative authority to the Treasury to
draft regulations implementing section 707(a)(2)(B), it is unclear whether this
statutory provision will be any more effective than existing regulations in
preventing disguised sales. 6 Under section 707(a)(2)(B), a transaction must
be properly characterized as a sale or exchange before non-partner treatment
will apply. The legislative history offers little guidance, however, in distinguishing between a sale and a contribution-distribution. Even under the prior
regulations, a transaction properly characterized as a sale was not entitled
to nonrecognition treatment under sections 721 and 731. New section
707(a)(2)(B) codifies the existing regulations but does not purport to alter
7
the general rules of Subchapter K concerning contributions and distributions.
This Article examines issues that will arise in drafting the section 707
regulations. Section I focuses on the potential for disguising sales or ex-

4. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVSIONS OF THE DEFCIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 at 225 (98th Cong., 2d Sess.) (Comm.

Print 1984) [hereinafter Comm. Print]. See also Communications Satellite Corp. v. United
States, 625 F.2d 997 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (cash distributions made by satellite consortium reflecting
payments made by new partners were tax-free distributions of the partnership and not proceeds
of a sale of partnership interests); Otey v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 312 (1978), aff'd per curiam,
634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1980) (contribution of property to partnership for which partner was
guaranteed payment from subsequent loan to the partnership held not to be a taxable sale);
Jupiter Corp. v. United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9168 (Cl. Ct. 1983) (payment by
new limited partners to existing partners not deemed a sale of partnership interests).
5. Section 707(a)(2)(B) applies if there is: (1) a direct or indirect transfer of money or
other property by a partner to a partnership, (2) a related direct or indirect transfer of money
or other property by the partnership to such partner (or another partner), and (3) the transfers,
when viewed together, are properly characterized as a sale or exchange. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B)
(1986). A companion provision, section 707(a)(2)(A), is directed toward related abuses involving
allocations and distributions as disguised payments for services or property. I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(A)
(1986).

6. Regulations under section 707(a)(2)(B) have not yet been issued. The ABA Section on
Taxation, Committee on Partnerships, recently submitted extensive comments in question and
answer form relating to section 707. Committee on Partnerships, Questions andAnswersRelating
to Section 707(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N (Mar. 18, 1987) [hereinafter
ABA § 707 Task Force]. For availability of these comments, see 35 TAX NOTES 25 (Apr.
6, 1987). This Article draws significantly on the comments of the ABA Task Force, but reaches
independent conclusions which differ in material respects from those of the ABA Task Force.

For earlier commentary on the disguised sale problem, see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section,
Comm. on Partnerships, Comments Relating to Proposed Regulations To Be Issued Pursuant
to Section 704(c), 707(a)(2) and 752 (1985) [hereinafter N.Y. Bar Comments]; ALI, FEaER.
INComE TAx PROJECT: SUBCHAPTER K, PROPOSALS ON THE TAxATION OF PARTN-ERs 165-87 (1984)

[hereinafter ALI TAx PROJECT].
7. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 231.
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changes of property between partners and partnerships as nonrecognition
transactions under prior regulations and case law. Section II examines the
need for clarification of the scope of section 707(a)(2)(B) as an anti-abuse
provision when property is transferred to a partnership and the contributing
partner receives a related distribution. Section III addresses the related problem of disguised sales of partnership interests resulting from distributions
in conjunction with the admission of new partners.
An underlying issue in all of these transaction is whether organizational
transfers to a partnership should be analyzed under an entity or an aggregate
partnership model. In general, Subchapter K adopts a predominantly aggregate approach to organizational transfers, but section 707 reflects a departure in the direction of an entity approach. Recently, two commentators
have proposed replacing the existing nonrecognition provisions of section
721 with "immediate sale" treatment based on an entity approach to organizational transfers.8 Section IV of this Article concludes that "deferred
sale" treatment is more consistent with the predominantly aggregate approach
of Subchapter K, and would accomplish substantially the same results as
immediate sale treatment while avoiding serious lock-in problems.

I.

CHARACTERizING DISGUISED SALES: CASE LAW AND
REGULATIONS PRIOR TO THE 1984 ACT
A.

Overview

The drafters of the regulations under the 1954 Code were aware of the
possibility of combining contributions and distributions to achieve the economic equivalent of a sale. Section 1.731-1(c)(3) of the regulations provides
that if within a short period before or after property is contributed to a
partnership, other property is distributed to the contributing partner and the
contributed property is retained by the partnership or another partner, section
731 may be inapplicable to the distribution. 9 Section 1.721-1(a) of the regulations provides that "if the transfer of property by the partner to the
partnership results in the receipt by a partner of money or other consideration
...
the transaction will be treated as a sale or exchange under section 707
rather than a contribution under section 721."0 According to section 1.7071(a) of the regulations, "the substance of the transaction will govern rather

8. See Keyser, A Theory of Nonrecognition Under an Income Tax: The Case of Partnership
Formation, 5 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 269-95 (1986); Postlewaite, Dutton & Magette, A Critique of
the ALI's FederalIncome Tax Project-SubchapterK: Proposalson the Taxation of Partners,
75 GEo. L.J. 423, 464-80 (1986) [hereinafter Postlewaite].
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(c)(3) (1987). The regulations provide further that if a distribution
has the effect of an exchange of property between two or more partners, or between the
partnership and a partner, it will be treated as an exchange.
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a) (1987).
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than its form" in determining whether a partner is acting in a non-partner
capacity." The regulations, however, fail to articulate criteria for distinguishing a disguised sale or exchange from a transaction governed by sections
721 and 731.
The regulations were intended to prevent transactions which constitute
sales in substance, though cast in the form of contributions and distributions,
from escaping sale treatment. Suppose that A contributes Blackacre, with a
value of $200 and a basis of $100, and B contributes $100 cash to a
partnership in return for equal partnership interests. A and B are credited
with capital accounts of $200 and $100 respectively. In order to equalize the
partner's capital contributions, the partnership immediately distributes $100
cash to A. If the transaction is governed by sections 721 and 731, A will
treat the $100 distribution as tax free since it does not exceed his $100 basis
in his partnership interest.' 2 The partnership will have a carryover basis of
3
$100 in Blackacre.1
If A is instead treated as selling a one-half interest in Blackacre to B, A
would recognize a gain of $50, the difference between the $100 cash received
and A's tax basis of $50 in one-half of Blackacre. Upon a contribution by
A and B of a one-half interest in Blackacre, the partnership would have a
stepped-up basis in one-half of Blackacre, reflecting the $50 of gain recognized by A. Although these different methods of capitalizing the partnership are economically equivalent, 4 A will defer reporting $50 of gain if
the form of the transaction is respected. In either case, however, A has
received $100 of cash for use outside the partnership.
The dichotomy between a sale and a contribution-distribution is further
complicated by the tax treatment of borrowed funds. A could have borrowed
$100 secured by Blackacre tax free and contributed the encumbered property
to the partnership. When a partnership assumes or takes property subject
to a liability of the contributor, the portion of the liability allocated to the
other partners under section 752 is treated as a cash distribution from the
partnership to the contributing partner. 5 A would not redognize gain on a
constructive distribution of $50, one-half of the liability, and A's basis in
his partnership interest would be reduced from $100 to $50. If the partnership
uses the $100 cash contributed by B to pay off the liability, A's remaining
basis in his partnership interest ($50) would be reduced to zero. The result

11. Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (1987).
12. Section 721(a) provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or
to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange
for an interest in the partnership." I.R.C. § 721(a) (1986). See also id. § 731 (1986) (recognition
of gain or loss on a distribution).
13. See I.R.C. § 723 (1986) (basis of contributed property).
14. See A. Wsais, J. PENNEL & P. POSTLEWArmE, PArNEnsmp TAxATION § 22.05 (3d ed.
1981) [hereinafter A. WiuLms].
15. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1986). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b)(2), (c) (1987).
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is the same as if A contributed the property free of liabilities to the partnership, and the partnership distributed $100 cash to A.
Under the existing regulations, it is difficult to characterize the above
transaction as a disguised sale, unless the constructive section 752 distribution
is treated as an actual cash distribution. A constructive section 752 distribution occurs, however, whenever property is contributed to a partnership
subject to liabilities. Disguised sale treatment seems inconsistent with the
regulations under section 722 which treat a transfer of encumbered property
as a tax-free section 721 contribution followed by a hypothetical cash distribution under section 752.16 Under the regulations, the contributing partner
recognizes gain on the deemed section 752 distribution only to the extent
that the portion of liabilities of which the contributor is relieved exceeds the
basis of the contributed property and the share of partnership liabilities
17
allocated to the transferor.
A transfer of property to a partnership, subject to liabilities incurred in
anticipation of the contribution, bears some resemblance to the problem
addressed by section 357(b) in the corporate context.' This provision treats
as taxable "boot" the entire amount of liabilities assumed on a contribution
of encumbered property to a corporation, if the contributing shareholder
had a principal purpose of tax avoidance or lacked a bona fide business
purpose. Section 357(b) is intended to prevent the transferor from bailing
cash out of a corporation with earnings and profits by borrowing against
the property just before the contribution, with the intention of keeping the
borrowed funds and having the corporation pay off the liability. Under
Subchapter K, however, cash distributions are normally tax free. Similarly,
a transfer of encumbered property is permitted without gain recognition,
even though a portion of the liability is effectively shifted to the other
partners. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish between disguised sales and
non-abusive transactions governed by the normal operating rules of Subchapter K.
B.

Transactions Cast as Contributionsand Distributions

Interpreting the Code and regulations prior to the 1984 Act, courts were
generous to taxpayers seeking to avoid disguised sale treatment. 9 These cases

16. Treas. Reg. § 1.722-1 (1987). See also W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WifmJRE, FEDERAL.
OF PARTmERsmrs AND PRTN'ERs
4.01151 (1977) (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter W.
McKEE].

TAXATION

17. Under Treasury Regulation section 1.752-1(e), a general partner's share of partnership
recourse liabilities corresponds to his interest in partnership losses, while his share of nonrecourse
liabilities corresponds to his profit interest.
18. See ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 178 n.17.
19. See, e.g., Park Realty v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 412 (1981) (acq. in result only); Otey
v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 312 (1978), aff'd per curiam, 634 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1980). See
also infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
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"generally fail[ed] to specifically articulate the legal principles on which their
decisions [were] based." ' 20 The courts applied the step-transaction, shamtransaction, and business-purpose tests to determine whether a purported
contribution and distribution should be treated as a taxable sale. The courts
also considered whether the form of the transaction accurately reflected the
parties' intent, and whether payment to the contributing partner was
contingent upon partnership profits. The case law allowed partners considerable flexibility in structuring transactions to achieve the most desirable tax
2
consequences, while warning that the choice of form was not unrestricted. '
Section 707(a)(2)(B) was enacted partly in response to the decision in Otey
v. Commissioner.22 In Otey, the taxpayer contributed land having a tax basis
of $18,500 and a fair market value of $65,000 to a real estate development
partnership, subject to an agreement that he would receive cash shortly
thereafter from anticipated partnership borrowings. The taxpayer's partner,
Thurman, contributed no capital but possessed the credit necessary to obtain
financing. Twelve days after the contribution of the property, the partnership
obtained a construction loan of $870,300, on which the partners were jointly
and severally liable. Within a five-month period, Otey received a series of
distributions approximately equal to the value of the contributed property.
The government argued that the transaction should be recast as a sale
under section 707 and section 1.731-1(c)(3) of the regulations, rather than
as a tax-free contribution and distribution. 23 The court, however, concluded
that the transaction was governed by sections 721 and 731, emphasizing that:
(1) the partners treated the transaction as a contribution and the form was
not artificial, (2) the land was essential to the partnership's business, (3) the
land constituted the partnership's only contributed capital, (4) the taxpayer
remained personally liable on the partnership's borrowing and might have
been required to repay the loan if the venture were unsuccessful, (5) preferential distributions to equalize capital accounts are "usual and customary,"
and (6) the taxpayer could have achieved the same result by borrowing
against the property as a sole proprietor. 24 Finally, the court noted that the
government's position would have been stronger had the cash distribution
been derived directly from the other partner's contribution, rather than from
25
partnership borrowing.
In Park Realty v. Commissioner,26 the court again upheld tax-free treatment for a partnership contribution promptly followed by a cash distribution.

20. Gross, Post-FormationDistributionsfrom Partnershipsto Partners,60 TAxEs 514, 514
(1982).
21.
22.
23.
24.

See, e.g., Barenholtz v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 85, 90 (1981) (flexibility is not unlimited).
70 T.C. 312 (1978).
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 319-21.

25. Id. at 321.
26. 77 T.C. 412 (1981).
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In Park Realty, the partnership agreed to reimburse the taxpayer for certain
pre-development expenses incurred in connection with contributed land, on
which the partnership intended to develop a shopping center. The taxpayer
received cash in excess of the actual pre-development costs from the proceeds
of sale of a portion of the partnership's land. The land was to be used by
several major department stores which planned to build their own facilities.
The government contended that the taxpayer had "sold" the pre-development expenses to the partnership, triggering taxable gain to the extent of
the excess payment.27 However, the court held for the taxpayer primarily
on the ground that the pre-development expenses did not represent assets
which were transferable or valuable apart from the land. 28 In addition, the
court noted that the benefit to the partnership from the pre-development
expenses undermined the government's argument that the taxpayer was acting
in a non-partner capacity. 29
Thus, in both Otey and Park Realty, the court emphasized that the
payments to the contributing partner were contingent or otherwise subject
to the risk of the partnership business. This suggests that if a partner's profit
from a transaction is assured, independent of the success or failure of the
joint undertaking, the partner should then be treated as acting in a nonpartner capacity under section 707. In Otey, the court concluded that the
taxpayer's right to the payment was contingent because the distribution was
derived from partnership borrowing and the taxpayer might have been called
upon to repay the loan in the event that the partnership defaulted. 0 However,
the court failed to focus on whether the noncontributing partner, Thurman,
would have been liable to his partner for a portion of the liability if the
partnership lacked sufficient funds. To the extent that Otey could have
proceeded against his partner for payment of one-half of the liability, he
was assured of retaining a portion of the distribution.
By contrast, the court's holding in Park Realty seems sound. In Park
Realty, the distribution was derived from a sale by the partnership of a
portion of its assets rather than from borrowed funds or capital contributions
of other partners.3 Since the distribution was contingent upon the partnership's operations, the other partners were not guaranteeing payment to the
contributor. If a distribution depends on a substantial contingency to which
a third party would be unlikely to agree without additional compensation
for the risk involved, the contributing partner is not acting in a non-partner
capacity. In Park Realty, however, it is unclear whether there was any

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 419.
Id. at 419-21.
Id. at 422.
Otey, 70 T.C. at 320.
Park Realty, 77 T.C. at 416.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:489

significant risk that the partnership would be unable to consummate the
purchase agreement with the department stores.
Park Realty also involved the potential abuse of shifting the pre-contribution gain on the sale of the contributed property from the transferor to
the other partners. The 1984 Act cured such abuses by amending section
704(c) to require that income, gain, loss and deductions with respect to
contributed property be shared among the partners so as to take into account
any difference between the basis of the property and its fair market value
at the time of contribution.3 2 The special allocation rules of section 704(c)
thus ensure that pre-contribution gain will ultimately be taxed to the contributing partner. The only difference is a matter of timing. If the initial
transfer is treated as a contribution rather than a disguised sale, the contributor will defer the potential gain until the partnership sells or otherwise
disposes of the contributed property.
In Barenholtz v. Commissioner,3a the taxpayer was unsuccessful in characterizing a sale as a contribution and distribution. The taxpayer initially
structured the transaction as a sale of an undivided interest in property to
three individuals, followed by a contribution of the undivided interests to a
partnership comprised of the taxpayer and the other three individuals. The
taxpayer subsequently sought to report the transaction as a contribution of
his entire interest in the property, coupled with a cash contribution by the
other partners, followed by a cash distribution equal to the amount contributed by the other partners. By recasting the transaction as a contribution
and distribution, the taxpayer sought to offset his entire basis in the property,
rather than only an allocable portion, against the amount of the distribution
under sections 721 and 731.
The court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to avoid sale treatment through
hindsight application of section 721 .34 Despite the flexibility allowed partners
in capitalizing a partnership, 35 the court indicated that even had the trans-

32. The 1984 Act amended old section 704(c) by making the optional rules of old section 704(c)(2)
mandatory for determining allocations with respect to contributed property. See 1984 Act, § 71(a),
98 Stat. 589 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 757 (1984), S. REP. No. 169,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 215 (1984). See generally Marich & McKee, Sections 704(c) and 743(b):
The Shortcomings of the Existing Regulationsand the Problem of Publicly TradedPartnerships,
41 TAX L. REv. 627 (1986).
33. 77 T.C. 85 (1981).
34. Id. at 90-91.
35. The court stated:
We think there were at least three methods, each with different tax consequences,
whereby such a capitalization of the partnership might have been accomplished.
First, petitioner could have sold [the property] to the partnership in a transaction
within the purview of section 707(a). Second, petitioner could have contributed
the property to the partnership pursuant to section 721 and the capital accounts
of the partners could have been equalized by distributions within the purview of
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action been cast in the form of a contribution and distribution, the form
might not be respected. 6 Barenholtz indicates merely that a taxpayer cannot
escape the consequences of the form of the transaction by arguing that a
"sale" was in substance a "contribution." Indeed, where the transaction is
cast in the form of a contribution, the taxpayer must be prepared to demonstrate that appearances correspond to reality.
C.

Transactions Cast as Sales

In some situations, it may be advantageous for a partner to structure a
transfer to a partnership as a sale rather than a contribution. Thus, owners
of appreciated land that is ripe for subdivision may seek to sell the land to
a partnership in order to ensure that the inherent appreciation will be taxed
as capital gain rather than ordinary income. 37 Since the partnership will
obtain a stepped-up basis, any ordinary income will be limited to the enhanced value attributable to the partnership's development activities. Alternatively, the sale format may be chosen in order to allow the transferor to
recognize a loss. The sale device will not be successful, however, if the
transferor owns more than 500/6 of the capital or profits interest in the
partnership, since section 707(b), as amended by the Tax Reform Act of
1986, would deny recognition of any loss and require any gain to be taxed
to the selling partner as ordinary income.38
The elimination of preferential treatment of capital gains under the 1986
Act may lessen the attractiveness of the sale format, but a sale may still be
advantageous if a taxpayer has capital losses that will fully absorb a capital
gain. Particularly if the taxpayer can postpone recognition through installment reporting, a sale may still be desirable to provide the partnership with
a stepped-up basis. The new passive loss rules may also enhance the attractiveness of a sale versus a contribution to a partnership.3 9 For example,
assume that a taxpayer owns a large apartment building to which is allocable
$500,000 of suspended passive losses. If the property is contributed to a
partnership, the section 721 nonrecognition transfer will not trigger suspended

section 731. Third, petitioner could have sold an undivided one-fourth interest in
the property to each of his partners followed by a contribution of the property
to the partnership by the partners.
Id. at 89-90 (footnotes omitted).
36. Id. at 90 n.6 (noting the significant fact that the taxpayer "received the payments in
question directly from his partners, albeit through an escrow agent").
37. See W. McKaE, supra note 16, 4.07[2].
38. I.R.C. § 707(b) (1986). The 1986 Act amended section 707(b) by reducing the percentage
of ownership for control purposes from 80% to 500. See 1986 Act, § 642(a)(2), 100 Stat. at
2284.
39. See I.R.C. § 469 (1986). See generally Lipton, Fun and Games with New PALs, 64
Thxa-s 801 (1986) (passive loss limitations); Shapiro, Your Tax Reform PAL, 33 TAx NoTEs
757 (Nov. 24, 1986) (passive loss limitations).
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passive losses.4 Structuring the transfer as a fully taxable sale may trigger
the suspended passive losses immediately, however, provided that the related
4
party rules of section 707(b) are not applicable. '
In two cases, the courts have considered whether transactions structured
as sales should be treated in accordance with their form where the taxpayer
sought the advantage of sale treatment. In Davis v. Commissioner,42 land
was sold to a partnership which was formed to develop condominiums on
the land. The taxpayer's controlled corporation and an unrelated party each
held 50% interests in the partnership. Under the partnership agreement, the
purchase price for the property was to be paid "with the first available
funds and in all events whether the project was a success or failure." 43 The
court held that the transaction constituted a sale by the taxpayer acting in
a non-partner capacity, relying chiefly upon the fact that the purchase price
was payable "in all events."- The court downplayed the fact that the
taxpayer would have been liable to himself for one-half of the purchase
43
price had the venture been unable to satisfy the obligation.
In Oliver v. Commissioner," the taxpayer transferred building lots to a
partnership pursuant to an oral agreement that the partnership would purchase the lots for their appraised value. The taxpayer's capital account was
originally credited with his cost for the property, but it was later increased
to reflect the appraised value at the time of contribution. The purchase price
was ultimately paid from the proceeds of the partnership's sale of the lots,
and the partnership agreement did not provide for payment from any other
source. The court held that the transfer was in substance a contribution
rather than a sale, viewing the purchase agreement as signifying merely that
the taxpayer would receive back his capital contribution first before any
division of profits.47
In Davis, the decisive factor was evidently that the payment to the contributing partner was guaranteed by the credit of the other partners to the
extent of their percentage partnership interests. In Oliver, by contrast, the
court viewed the payment as a distribution because the other partner was
not guaranteeing payment in the event of a partnership default. In the case
of a general partnership in which one partner contributes all of the capital
and the other partner contributes only services, however, the distinction may

40. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 727 (1986) (suspended passive activity losses
triggered only "[w]hen the taxpa3rer disposes of his entire interest in the property received in
the tax-free exchange").
41. I.R.C. § 469(g)(1)(A), (B) (1986).
42. 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 749 (1970).
43. Id. at 757.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 67 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1955).
47. Id. at 69-70.
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have no economic significance. Under partnership law, general partners may
have an obligation to contribute the amount of any deficit capital account
on liquidation of the partnership, unless the partnership agreement expressly
4
provides otherwise.
For example, assume A contributes land with a basis and fair market
value of $100 and B contributes only services to general partnership AB.
Although the capital accounts are unequal, A and B agree to share all profits
and losses equally. All profits are distributed currently during the term of
the partnership, so that pre-liquidation capital accounts remain $100 for A's
benefit and zero for B. If the partnership property is then sold for only
$80, resulting in an economic loss of $20 allocated equally to A and B, A
will have a positive capital account of $90 and B will have a capital account
deficit of $10. Unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, B will
be required to contribute to the partnership the amount of his deficit capital
account balance for distribution to A. In effect, A bears the economic
burden of one-half of the loss, or $10, and can proceed against B individually
to collect the remaining $10.
A delayed payment obligation of the Davis type, which does not specify
a fixed time of payment or bear interest, should probably not be viewed as
sufficient to justify sale treatment. It might be argued that the parties should
be permitted to choose sale treatment if they wish, since other prbvisions
specifically address abuses in this area. The related party rules, however,
apply only if more than 50% common ownership exists and merely circumscribe the benefits of sale treatment, even though a transaction is in substance
a sale. Because sale treatment may still be advantageous in certain circumstances, the test should be an objective one based on the substance rather
than the form of the transaction.
II.

DISGUISED SALES AFTER THE 1984 ACT:
THE FORTHCOMING REGULATIONS

A.

Disguised Payments for Property or Services

Congress was concerned that the existing regulations failed to address
adequately the potential abuses of disguised sales. The 1984 Act amended
section 707 to provide two new rules for determining when a partner is
deemed to be engaging in a transaction with a partnership in a non-partner
capacity. Section 707(a)(2)(A) is intended to prevent the use of related allocations and distributions as disguised payments for property or services.

48. See UNIF. PA TNERssmP ACT § 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 1, 213 (1968) (unless otherwise agreed,
partners "must contribute toward the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the
partnership" in proportion to their respective partnership interests in profits).
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Section 707(a)(2)(B) deals directly with sales disguised as contributions and
distributions.
Although sections 707(a)(2)(A) and 707(a)(2)(B) deal with related abuses,
the tax consequences of recharacterizing transactions under these two provisions are quite different with respect to the contributing and noncontributing partners. If section 707(a)(2)(A) applies to a related allocation and
distribution, the primary effect is to increase the share of partnership income
allocable to the noncontributing partners. By contrast, the tax consequences
to the contributing partner will generally be the same whether he is taxed
on a purported allocation as a distributive share of partnership income or
whether the accompanying distribution is recast under section 707(a)(2)(A)
as a payment for property or services. The tax stakes are reversed, however,
if section 707(a)(2)(B) applies to a related contribution and distribution, since
the recharacterization will chiefly affect the contributing partner who would
otherwise be treated as receiving a tax-free distribution.
1. Transfers of Property and Related Allocations: Section
707(a)(2)(A)
Section 707(a)(2)(A) nominally applies to transfers of property as well as
services. It is aimed primarily, however, at the performance of services for
a partnership by a partner acting as a third party. Congress was aware that
partnership income could be deflected to a service provider by allocating to
a purported partner performing services an amount of partnership income
approximately equal to the fee that would otherwise have been paid to the
service provider. 49 By reducing the amount of income reportable by the other
partners, the net effect of an allocation to the service provider for expenses
of a capital nature is the same as a current deduction of a nondeductible
expenditure. Section 707(a)(2)(A) combats this technique by providing that
an allocation and distribution to a partner in connection with the performance
of services or the transfer of property by a partner may be recharacterized
as a transaction occurring between the partnership and a non-partner. In
general, section 707(a)(2)(A) provides that allocations and distributions to
partners will be treated as section 707(a)(1) payments for non-partner services
if necessary to reflect properly their economic substance. Depending on the
character of the services, the partnership must capitalize the payment to the
non-partner where appropriate, thereby increasing the other partners' shares
of taxable income.50
49. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 223-24. See generally McKee, PartnershipAllocations:
The Need for an Entity Approach, 66 VA. L. Rav. 1039 (1980) (discussing the use of entity
analysis); Postlewaite & Cameron, Twisting Slowly in the Wind: Guaranteed Payments After
the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 40 TAx LAW. 649 (1987) (discussing the relationship of sections
707(a) and 707(c)).
50. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 227-31 (listing six factors to determine whether a putative
partner is receiving a distribution in a non-partner capacity).
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Typically, section 707(a)(2)(A) will not apply to a property transfer because
a related allocation and distribution disguised as a payment for property
would cause the partnership to pay for the property twice. Under the section
704(b) rules for maintaining capital accounts, a contributing partner's capital
51
account must be increased by the fair market value of contributed property.
An allocation of additional income to the contributing partner as a disguised
payment for property would result in a double capital account credit. This
type of double counting for the contributed property would alter the economic arrangement among the partners, and is therefore unlikely to be
accepted by the noncontributing partners. Accordingly, the legislative history
indicates that related allocations and distributions in connection with property
transfers will generally not trigger disguised sale treatment because the "requirement that capital accounts be respected under section 704(b) (and the
proposed regulations thereunder) makes income allocations which are disguised payments for capital economically unfeasible and therefore unlikely
52
to occur."
For example, assume that a partner contributes appreciated property with
a value of $200 and is to receive a preferential allocation and distribution
from partnership gross income equal to a 20% return on his capital contribution for the first five years. During the first five years, the contributing
partner will receive total allocations and distributions equal to $200. These
allocations will be credited and the distributions will be debited to the
contributing partner's capital account, leaving a positive balance of $200
which represents the fair market value of the contributed property. If the
partnership is then liquidated, the regulations under section 704(b) require
that the liquidating distributions be in accordance with the partners' positive
capital account balances. 53 Since the contributing partner would be entitled
to a liquidating distribution of $200, the partnership would in effect have
paid twice for the value of the contributed property. Relying on the economic
tension between the partners to prevent such double counting, Congress
believed that purported allocations and distributions would be unlikely to
54
represent disguised property payments.
Similarly, the legislative history provides that disguised sale treatment is
generally inappropriate when a contributing partner receives a distribution
and a related allocation of gain.5 5 For example, assume that a partner

51. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b) (1987). The fair market value assigned to contributed
property will be considered correct, provided that the partners have sufficiently adverse interests
and reasonably agree on such value. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(h).
52. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 229. See generally Gunn, The Characterof a Partner's
Distributive Share Under the "Substantial Economic Effect" Regulations, 40 TAx LAw. 121
(1986) (analyzing the section 704(b) regulations).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2) (1987).
54. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 229.
55. Id. at 231.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:489

contributes property with a basis of $100 and a fair market value of $200.
On a subsequent sale of the property by the partnership, section 704(c)
requires that any excess of the fair market value of the property over its
tax basis at the time of contribution be specially allocated to the contributing
partner. A related distribution of the sales proceeds to the contributing
partner is not abusive, since the contributing partner must recognize any
gain deferred on contribution immediately when the partnership sells the
property. Hence, the exception for an allocation of gain and a related
distribution is generally proper, assuming that capital accounts are maintained in accordance with the section 704(b) regulations.
Congress nevertheless believed that there might be rare situations in which
a purported allocation and distribution represented a disguised sale of property. Accordingly, the legislative history warns that disguised sale treatment
may apply to a related allocation and distribution if: (1) valuation of the
contributed property is below fair market value, (2) the property is sold by
the partner to the partnership at a price below its fair market value, or (3)
the capital accounts will be respected at such a distant point in the future
that their present value is small and there is no meaningful return on capital
accounts in the interval. 56 Understatement of the value of contributed or
purchased property, or the likelihood that capital accounts will not be satisfied until some distant date are circumstances which mitigate the double
counting problem. If the present value of the contributing partner's capital
account is small and the contributing partner enjoys no meaningful return
on his capital account in the meantime, then the other partners might be
willing to compensate the contributing partner through an increased allocation of additional income. Such an allocation and distribution, in the form
of a disguised payment for property, might permit the partnership to avoid
the requirement to capitalize the purchase price of property, without any
economic detriment to the contributing partner.
For example, assume that a partner contributes property with a basis of
zero and a fair market value of $100, and the contribution is reflected in
the partnership's books and in the contributing partner's capital account at
its zero basis. If the partnership allocates $100 of additional income to the
contributing partner and makes a corresponding distribution, the contributing
partner will be in the same economic position as if he had sold the contributed
property for its fair market value. Because $100 of partnership income will
be deflected to the contributing partner through the additional allocation,
however, the distributive share of the noncontributing partners will be correspondingly reduced. In effect, the noncontributing partners will receive
the economic equivalent of a current deduction for the purchase price of
the property acquired from the contributing partner. In this unusual situa-

56. Id. at 229.
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tion, section 707(a)(2)(A) will apply to recast the transaction as a disguised
sale of the contributing partner's property to the partnership.
Such situations are likely to be rare, however, since the partnership's
failure to credit the contributing partner's capital account with the fair market
value of the contributed property will generally cause the partnership allocations to lack "economic effect" under the section 704(b) regulations; the
failure to meet the detailed capital account requirements of section 704(b)
will thus require reallocation of the partnership's income, gain, loss, and7
deductions in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership.1
Although section 704(b) does not technically apply when a purported 5allo8
cation is received by a partner other than in his capacity as a partner it
seems appropriate under section 704(b) principles to disregard the defective
allocation and increase the partners' distributive shares of partnership income
in proportion to their overall profit and loss sharing ratios. In addition, the
contributing partner ought to be taxed as if he had received the preferential
distribution as a disguised payment for the contributed property.5 9 Thus, the
section 707 regulations should be coordinated with the economic effect test
of the section 704(b) regulations.
The legislative history also indicates that the disguised sale provisions are
not intended to affect distributions that create deficit capital accounts for
which the distributee is liable. 60 This safe harbor should apply, however,
only to the extent that the obligation to restore deficit capital accounts has
substantial economic effect within the meaning of the section 704(b) regulations. Since the. distributee will be required to restore the deficit, the
distribution is similar to a loan and should not be treated as a disguised
payment for property (or a partnership interest). 6' The safe harbor does not
apply if the deficit capital account is "improperly understated or not expected
to be made up until such a distant point in the future that its present value
is small." 62 A distribution which creates such a deficit capital account may
be subject to section 707(a)(2)(A) if it is accompanied by an allocation of
income or gain. Ordinarily, a contributing partner would be unwilling to
accept such a deficit capital account liability, since he would not have received
payment for the full fair market value of his property.
2.

Transfers of Property and Related Distributions: Section
707(a)(2)(B)

Section 707(a)(2)(B) isthe provision intended primarily to deal with disguised sales of property by a partner acting in a non-partner capacity. Section
57. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(a), 1.704-1(b)(3) (1987).

58. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(v) (1987).
59. See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 43 (Q&A 43); id. at 33 (Q&A 34).
60. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 232. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (1987) (circumstances under which a partner will be considered liable to restore a deficit in his capital account).
See also id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2).
61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(b) (1987).
62. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 232.
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707(a)(2)(B) applies if: (1)a partner transfers money or other property
(directly or indirectly) to a partnership, (2) there is a related direct or indirect
transfer of money or other property by the partnership to that partner (or
another partner), and (3) when viewed together, the transfers are properly
characterized as a sale of property.
A transaction' described in section 707(a)(2)(B) is treated as a sale or
exchange of property (including a partnership interest) occurring between
the partnership and a non-partner or between two or more partners acting
in a non-partner capacity. The selling partner will recognize gain or loss to
the same extent as if all or a portion of the property were sold to a third
party. 63 The portion of the property sold should be determined by comparing
the amount distributed with the fair market value of the contributed property.
The relevant fair market value of the contributed property should generally
be its fair market value as reflected in the partners' capital accounts as
determined for purposes of section 704(c). The portion of a distribution in
excess of the fair market value of the contributed property generally should
not be treated as part of the sale proceeds, provided that capital accounts
are respected.64
If the contributing partner is to receive a series of distributions, at least
two possible approaches to the timing of gain are possible. 65 Under the first
approach, the sale would be treated as occurring at the time of the transfer.
Related distributions would be treated as payments under a contingent installment obligation, and gain would be reported on the installment method
as such payments are actually received. Under this approach, section 1274
or section 483 would recharacterize a portion of the distribution as interest
if the installment obligation bears unstated or inadequate interest. The contributing partner would be required to recognize any recaptures or similar
items in the year of transfer. 66 A transfer of the contributing partner's
partnership interest prior to receipt of all distributions would be treated as
a disposition of an installment obligation, triggering deferred gain. 67

63. An exchange of like-kind property between two partners that is run through the partnership may nevertheless qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition treatment, subject to the boot
recognition rules of section 1031(b). Cf. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (1986) (excluding from nonrecognition treatment an exchange of "interests in a partnership"). See generally Burke, An
Aggregate Approach to Indirect Exchanges of PartnershipInterests: Reconciling Section 1031
and Subchapter K, 6 VA. TAx REv. 459 (1987) (discussing the use of aggregate analysis).
64. For purposes of determining gain or loss, basis should presumably be allocated in
proportion to the fair market value of that portion of the property which is deemed to be sold
or contributed. See Rev. Rul. 78-357, 1978-2 C.B. 227 (suggesting that a contribution of property
to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest plus "boot" be treated as a taxable
section 707(a)(1) transaction to the extent of "boot" received).
65. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 48-49.
66. See I.R.C. § 453(i) (1986).
67. See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 59 (Q&A 71); id. at 58 (Q&A 70). See
also N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 52.
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Under the second approach, the taxable event would be treated as occurring
only when a related distribution occurs, without application of section 1274
or section 483. In effect, the transaction would be held open until the time
of actual payment, when the amount received becomes ascertainable. 68 Although this second approach has the benefit of simplicity and administrative
ease, it is difficult to reconcile it with the statutory language which seems
to require that the "transfer" itself be treated as the sale event. Another
drawback is that the second approach may be conceptually inconsistent with
the idea of using fair market value at the time of contribution for purposes
of determining the portion of the property deemed sold. Even if the regulations permit the second approach under some circumstances, it should not
be available if the contributing partner receives in substance a non-contingent
obligation to pay a fixed amount at a definite time. 69 In this event, the
transfer itself should be viewed as the sale event, subject to the rules of
section 1274 and section 483. Under either approach, any adjustments to
the partnership's basis should occur only when, and to the extent that, the
contributing partner recognizes gain.
B.

PartnershipBorrowing and Transfers of Encumbered Property

A partner contributing property to a partnership may extract cash in two
ways: by borrowing against the property and then contributing the encumbered property to the partnership or by contributing the property and then
causing the partnership to borrow against it and distribute the proceeds of
the borrowing to the contributing partner. Regardless of how the transaction
is structured, the economic effect may resemble a sale if the contributing
partner receives cash from borrowed proceeds and directly or indirectly shifts
the economic burden of repaying the debt to the partnership or the other
partners. In enacting the disguised sale provisions, Congress intended that
the section 752 rules for sharing partnership liabilities would govern in
determining whether a contributing partner has retained substantive liability
for borrowed funds. Because the section 752 sharing rules were developed
in a different context and may themselves fail to reflect economic reality,
however, application of these rules to the disguised sale provisions is fraught
with difficulties.
The legislative history provides that disguised sale treatment may apply
when:
(1) the transferor partner receives the proceeds of a loan related to the
property and responsibility for repayment of the loan rests, directly or
indirectly, with the partnership (or its assets) or the other partners, or

68. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 49.
69. Id.
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(2) the partner has received a loan related to the property in anticipation
of the transaction and responsibility for repayment of the loan is transferred, directly
or indirectly, to the partnership (or its assets) or the other
70
partners .
According to the legislative history, no change is intended in the "general
rules concerning the tax treatment of partners under sections 721, 731 and
752" upon a contribution of property encumbered by liabilities not incurred
in anticipation of the contribution. 7' Nor is a change intended upon a
contribution resulting in a shift in existing partnership liabilities not incurred
in anticipation of the contribution.7 2
The Joint Committee Report contains additional language clarifying the
treatment of liabilities where a partner contributes property to a partnership
and that property is then borrowed against, pledged as collateral for a loan,
or otherwise refinanced. If the proceeds of the loan are distributed to the
contributing partner:
there is not a disguised sale to the extent the distributed proceeds are
attributable to indebtedness properly allocable to the contributing partner
under the rules of section 752 (i.e., to the extent that the contributing
partner is considered to retain substantive liability for repayment of the
borrowed amounts), since, in effect, the partner in this case has simply
borrowed through the partnership.7
The Joint Committee Report adds, however, that disguised sale treatment
may apply "to the extent the other partners directly or indirectly (as through
the exposure of their share of partnership asset [sic]) bear the risk of loss
with respect to the borrowed amounts. ' 7 4 The rule that the other partners
and the partnership assets must bear no direct or indirect risk of loss is
more far-reaching than the present section 752 rules concerning the assumption of liabilities.75 In the 1984 Act, Congress also directed the Treasury
to revise the existing section 752 rules for sharing partnership liabilities to
ensure that liabilities be allocated, to the extent possible, to those partners
bearing "the economic risk of loss with respect to such liabilities. ' 76 The
revised section 752 regulations are expected to address the rules for sharing
both recourse and nonrecourse liabilities.
Under the existing section 752 regulations, recourse liabilities are allocated
among general partners in accordance with their ratios for sharing losses,
thereby reflecting the manner in which such liabilities would be funded in

70. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 232.
71. Id. at 231.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 232.
74. Id.
75. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1986). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(2) (1987) (treating an
assumption of a partnership liability by a partner as a contribution of cash).
76. H.R. REP. No. 432, pt. 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1235 (1984).
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the event of a partnership default. 77 Since a recourse creditor may proceed
against the obligor's personal assets, general partners theoretically are personally liable for repayment of recourse debt if the partnership has insufficient assets. The allocation of recourse liabilities based on the contingency
of partnership default may be unrealistic because "most loans, whether
recourse or nonrecourse, are based primarily on the value of the property
used to secure the loan, and in the event of default, the lender typically
looks first to the property rather than any persons who may be personally
liable." ' 78 Moreover, the section 752 sharing rules overlook the likelihood
that recourse debt may be retired from partnership profits or assets. 79 Thus,
the language in the 1984 Act concerning "economic risk of loss" may be
interpreted as requiring modification of the rules allocating recourse debt in
accordance with the partners' loss ratios.' 0 Although the revised section 752
regulations may provide additional clarity and refinement, it seems unlikely
that they will abandon the personal liability theory for sharing recourse
liabilities."'
1.

Reversing Otey-Type Transactions

Congress evidently intended that section 707(a)(2)(B) would reverse the
result in Otey, cited with disapproval in the legislative history. 2 Despite
Congress' intent to treat an Otey-type transaction as a sale, however, section
707(a)(2)(B) does not clearly reach this result. Under the specific facts in
Otey, the distribution from partnership borrowing was less than the contributing partner's allocable share of the partnership's recourse liabilities
which substantially exceeded the fair market value of the contributed property. Since the entire distribution could conceivably be viewed as allocable
only to Otey's share of partnership liabilities under section 752, taxpayers
might reasonably conclude that section 707(a)(2)(B) does not require sale
treatment on identical facts. Nevertheless, given Congress' express disapproval of the result in Otey, section 707(a)(2)(B) should be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the legislative intent. To avoid any uncertainty, the
regulations should specifically state that the new statute is intended to reverse
the Otey result.

77. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1987).
78. W. McKEE, supra note 16, 8.01[1] n.6.
79. Id.
80. See Postlewaite & Bialosky, Liabilitiesin the PartnershipContext-Policy Concernsand
the Forthcoming Regulations, 33 UCLA L. Rav. 733, 747 n.32 (1986). See generally Burke &
Fried, Allocating PartnershipLiabilities, 41 TAx L. REv. 173 (1986) (criticizing existing allocation rules).
81. See Postlewaite & Bialosky, supra note 80, at 791-92.
82. See Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 225; supra notes 22-25, 30 and accompanying text.
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Even if Otey is reversed for transactions occurring after enactment of
section 707(a)(2)(B), however, it is uncertain whether a contributing partner
in an Otey-type transaction will be treated as selling all or only a portion
of the contributed property. In Otey, the government argued unsuccessfully
that the transaction should be treated as a sale of the entire property to the
partnership, rather than a sale of only a portion of the property. Partial
sale treatment seems more appropriate under these circumstances, however.
According to the Joint Committee Report, a distribution of borrowed funds
will not result in disguised sale treatment to the extent that the distributee
retains substantive liability for repayment of the debt. 3 Since the taxpayer
in Otey was personally liable for half of the partnership borrowing if partnership funds were insufficient, section 707(a)(2)(B) should treat a similar
transaction as a sale of only a one-half interest in the property.
This treatment would reflect the sharing of the economic burden of repaying the underlying liabilities according to section 752, if such liabilities
were taken into account only to the extent of the fair market value of the
contributed property. Under section 752(c), a liability to which property is
subject is considered a liability of the owner only to the extent of the fair
market value of the property. Therefore, in cases such as Otey where the
liabilities exceed the fair market value of contributed property, part-sale
treatment is consistent with the limitation on liabilities under section 752(c).
A fair-market-value limitation on the amount of liabilities taken into account
is also necessary to ensure consistent treatment regardless of whether the
property is borrowed against before or after the contribution to a partnership.
In Otey-type transactions, it will often be difficult to determine whether
the distribution is derived from partnership borrowings or the capital contributions of other partners.8 4 The distinction is important, however, because
the tax consequences to the contributing partner may be quite different
depending on the source of the distribution. 5 On the one hand, only a
portion of the distribution, determined under section 752, will be treated as
disguised sale proceeds if the source of the distribution is considered to be
partnership borrowing. On the other hand, the entire distribution will be
treated as disguised sale proceeds if the source of the distribution is considered to be capital contributions of other partners. The source of the distribution generally will not have any significant effect on the noncontributing
partners, however. Although the source of the distribution might be determined under a facts-and-circumstances test, such a test would be administratively difficult to apply. Therefore, the regulations may adopt a presumption
that distributions are traceable first to capital contributions of other partners

83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
84. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 47.
85. Id. at 48-49.
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rather than partnership borrowing, absent clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary.

86

For example, assume that A contributes property worth $200, with a tax
basis of $100, and B contributes $100 cash to a partnership. If the partnership
immediately distributes $100 to A, A should be treated as having sold onehalf of the contributed property. The result should be the same if B contributes $100 cash and the partnership also borrows $200. A distribution of
$100 of borrowed funds to A should be treated as a sale of one-half of A's
property, even though the distribution does not exceed A's share of liabilities
under section 752. Under the presumptive tracing rule, the $100 distribution
should be traced to B's capital contribution, unless the partnership overcomes
the presumption.
2.

Nonrecourse Liabilities

The legislative history seems to indicate that no disguised sale results if
contributed property is transferred subject to nonrecourse liabilities because
the economic burden of repayment will not be shifted to any of the other
partners or partnership assets.8 7 Under the section 752 sharing rules, nonrecourse liabilities are allocated among the partners in accordance with their
share of partnership profits. 8 Since none of the partners bears any personal
liability for repayment of the debt, allocation of nonrecourse liabilities in
accordance with profit ratios reflects the assumption that such debt will be
repaid only if the partnership has sufficient profits. If contributed property
is transferred subject to nonrecourse liabilities and the partnership specially
allocates the gain from the contributed property to the contributing partner
under section 704(c) principles, the special allocation may be sufficient to
prevent any portion of the liabilities from being allocated to the other
partners.8 9 Since the contributing partner is specially allocated the profits
that will be used to retire the liability, arguably the nonrecourse liabilities
should be assigned only to the contributing partner.
If the contributed property is subsequently disposed of by sale, abandonment, or otherwise, the amount realized on the disposition will include the
nonrecourse liabilities under Commissioner v. Tufts. 9° In Tufts, the fairmarket-value limitation of section 752(c) was confined to contributions and
distributions of partnership property, as opposed to sales or exchanges. 91

86. Cf. id. at 49 (determination of the source of distributions should be based on a factsand-circumstances test). See also infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
87. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 232-33.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1987).
89. W. McKEE, supra note 6, 4.03.
90. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
91. Id. at 314-17. See Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAxEs 949 (1983).
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Section 7701(g), added by the 1984 Act, codifies Tufts by providing that
the fair market value of property on a disposition shall be treated as not
less than the amount of liabilities to which the property is subject. In
accordance with section 704(c) principles, the contributing partner would
apparently be required to recognize any pre-contribution gain to the extent
of the nonrecourse liabilities on disposition of the property. Although the
deferral of the contributor's gain may be significant because of the time
value of money, a taxpayer may normally receive nonrecourse borrowing
tax free even though the liabilities exceed the basis of the property. 92
Given the broad authority that Congress granted to the Treasury in this
area, the regulations may nevertheless conclude that consistent treatment of
recourse and nonrecourse borrowing is necessary to prevent avoidance of
the disguised sale rules. 93 This approach would not seem to be precluded by
the contrary implication in the legislative history that a disguised sale does
4
not result if nonrecourse borrowing is secured by the contributed property.
Frequently, other partnership assets, including equity in the contributed
property, will be available to service principal and interest on the nonrecourse
debt.9 The regulations, therefore, may interpret broadly the language in the
legislative history that the other partners must not bear the risk of loss
associated with the partnership borrowing, directly or indirectly, through
their share of partnership assets. 96 The revised section 752 regulations, however, should clarify how nonrecourse liabilities are allocated among the
partners when a contributing partner receives a special allocation of gain
with respect to contributed property transferred to the partnership subject
97
to nonrecourse liabilities.
3.

Nonabusive Transactions

A contribution of property subject to recourse or nonrecourse liabilities
should not result in disguised sale treatment, however, merely because of a
constructive section 752 distribution provided that the liability was not incurred in anticipation of the contribution.9" If the prospective partner has
not "cashed out" his investment through borrowing in expectation of a
contribution, the prerequisite for deemed sale treatment is absent. Therefore,

92. See Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'g 16 T.C. 649
(1951) (nonrecourse borrowing not a taxable event even though loan proceeds exceed taxpayer's
basis in the property).
93. See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 52 (Q&A 59).
94. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
95. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 38.
96. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
97. The section 707 regulations should be coordinated with the revision of the section 752
regulations to address this issue.
98. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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the rule that a transfer of property subject to preexisting debt generally does
not give rise to disguised sale treatment is consistent with the congressional
intent not to alter the general rules concerning the tax treatment of partners
under sections 721, 731, and 752.
The disguised sale rules seem sufficiently broad to encompass transactions
in which a partner borrows funds to acquire, improve or refinance property
in anticipation of a contribution of the encumbered property to a partnership.9 9 The legislative history indicates, however, that Congress intended the
regulations to take into account Congress' "concern with transactions that
attempt to disguise a sale of property and not with non-abusive transactions
... ."00 Disguised sale treatment does not seem appropriate when borrowed
funds are used to acquire, improve, or refinance property, since the contributing partner has not extracted cash from the property for his personal
use. From the Treasury's perspective, it should make no difference whether
funds are borrowed in connection with acquisition and improvement of
property before or after formation of the partnership.' 0° Accordingly, the
regulations should provide that disguised sale treatment does not result to
the extent that pre-contribution borrowing is used exclusively to: (1) finance
the acquisition or improvement of the contributed property, (2) refinance a
loan encumbering the property which was not incurred in anticipation of
the contribution, or (3) pay costs and expenses directly related to such
refinancing. 102
A partner may contribute property subject to recourse liabilities, remaining
primarily liable for the indebtedness on the contributed property. Even if
the debt is incurred in anticipation of the contribution, disguised sale treatment should not result since the contributing partner has retained substantive
liability for repayment of the borrowed funds. The section 752 regulations
do not provide specific guidance concerning the allocation of liabilities where
a partner remains primarily liable on encumbered property transferred to a
partnership. Consistent with the economic-risk-of-loss standard mandated by
Congress, the revised section 752 regulations should allocate the entire liability in this situation to the partner who will ultimately be forced to repay
the indebtedness. If the contributing partner retains primary liability with
respect to only a portion of the indebtedness, the debt should presumably
be bifurcated for purposes of the disguised sale rules. 03

99. The Joint Committee Report indicates that disguised sale treatment may be appropriate
when a partner would have been forced to repay the liability within a short time had the
liability not been assumed and paid by the partnership, even though the liability is not incurred
in anticipation of a contribution. Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 231 n.10.
100. Id. at 231.
101. W. McKaa, supra note 16, 13.0215][b].
102. See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 53-54 (Q&A 62).
103. See Rev. Rul. 84-118, 1984-2 C.B. 120 (bifurcating partnership liability into recourse
and nonrecourse portions); Postlewaite & Bialosky, supra note 80, at 774-76.
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C. Step- Transaction Issues
Disguised sale treatment will result only if a series of transfers, when
4
viewed together, are "properly characterized as a sale of . . . property."''0
The legislative history states that the Treasury may issue regulations that
"provide for a period, such as three years, during which contributions by
and distributions to the same or another partner will normally be presumed
to be related for purposes of the disguised sale rule."'' 0 Thus, transfers
occurring within the specified period would be collapsed into a single transaction, resulting in retroactive sale treatment under section 707(a)(2)(B) unless
the taxpayer overcame the presumption that the transfers were prearranged.
If a distribution occurs more than three years before or after a contribution,
the regulations may establish a presumption that the transfers are unrelated.
Consistent with the latitude granted by Congress, the regulations should
establish presumptive rules, rather than leaving application of the statute to
be governed solely by subjective intent.'0 The presumption might be rebuttable with a showing of clear and convincing evidence, or some other
standard, that a distribution was not anticipated at the time of the contribution. A three-year rule should generally be sufficient to safeguard against
abuses. The regulations should make clear, however, that the statute can be
applied to clearly abusive transactions that are designed to fall outside the
three-year rule.
For example, a mere delay in the timing of a distribution should not be
sufficient to preclude disguised sale treatment if the contributing partner is
reasonably certain to receive a distribution. Otherwise, the partnership could
simply invest retained cash in relatively risk-free assets, such as bonds or
certificates of deposit, for subsequent distribution. The installment sale provisions provide that receipt of evidence of indebtedness will be treated as
an actual payment if "secured directly or indirectly by cash or a cash
' 7
equivalent, such as a bank certificate of deposit or a treasury note."'
Therefore, if a partnership holds such assets for the purpose of distributing
them to a contributing partner, and the assets are not pledged to secure
other obligations of the partnership, a distribution occurring outside the
three-year period should be recharacterized as a disguised payment for property. 0 8 Applying this same reasoning, an obligation of the partnership fixed
in amount and time of payment should also trigger deemed sale treatment,
regardless of whether the payment schedule extends beyond the three-year
period. '09

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

I.R.C. § 707(a)(2)(B) (1986).
Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 232.
See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 32.
Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(b)(3) (1987).
See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 48-49 (Q&A 52).
Se' Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1 (1987).
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Similar step-transaction issues may arise in determining whether there is
a prearranged plan to combine borrowing with a partnership contribution.
It seems unrealistic to treat any borrowing incurred within three years of a
contribution as presumptively related to the contribution."10 A six-month
rule is more likely to reflect business realities in testing whether the borrowing
and contribution are related. If the borrowing occurs more than six months
before the contribution, there should be no presumption of prearrangement.
A borrowing which occurs less than six months prior to a contribution may
be presumed to be related, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate the absence
of prearrangement.
Disguised sale treatment should apply only if the contributing partner
receives, or is "reasonably certain" to receive, a distribution related to the
contribution."' The regulations should provide examples illustrating when a
distribution will be considered to be reasonably certain based on facts and
circumstances. The examples should focus on the source of the payment,the degree of risk involved, and other relevant factors. Particularly, the
regulations should address whether a distribution which is derived from
operating cash flow earned after the contribution can be considered a disguised payment for property. Under a facts and circumstances test, the
regulations might focus on the likelihood at the time of contribution, given
the nature of the partnership's business, of whether sufficient cash flow
would be available to make the distribution. Alternatively, the regulations
might adopt a presumption that a preferential distribution from subsequent
operating cash flow is not reasonably certain, regardless of the likelihood
of sufficient operating cash flow.
A preferential distribution that can be derived only from partnership cash
flow from operations-as opposed to partnership borrowings, contributions,
or sales of contributed property-should normally be viewed as subject to
material entrepreneurial risk." 2 Because the contributing partner would not
be assured of receiving the preferential distribution in a non-partner capacity,
disguised sale treatment seems inappropriate." 3 Even if the partnership agreement does not specifically restrict the source of a preferential distribution,
disguised sale treatment should arguably not apply if the preferential distribution is in fact dependent on net cash flow from operations. In this
situation, to avoid disguised sale treatment, the distributee partner should
be required to demonstrate that the distribution would not have been made
had the partnership not generated sufficient cash flow." 4 Thus, a preferential
distribution actually derived from net cash flow might nevertheless be viewed

110. See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 49-50 (Q&A 54).
I11. See ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 187.
112. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 35.
113. See ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 187.
114. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 35-36.
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as disguised sale proceeds if circumstances indicate that the partnership would
have satisfied the preference from borrowings or other sources in the absence
of sufficient net cash flow.
If a distribution is derived from a source other than partnership net cash
flow from operations, the regulations should focus on whether the distribution is subject to a contingency within the control of the partners. For
example, a partnership may borrow funds for construction which is to be
completed for a fixed price within three years after a contribution of property. If the partnership agreement provides that excess borrowed funds are
to be distributed to the contributing partner when the construction is completed, and the amount of the borrowing exceeds the fixed cost of the
construction, the distribution should be treated as a disguised payment for
property.11 5 If the construction cost is not fixed and the distribution will
occur only to the extent that the partnership has excess borrowed funds
upon completion of the construction, there may be a substantial risk that
the partnership will have insufficient funds to make the distribution. Because
the cost of the construction is a contingency outside the control of the
partners, a subsequent distribution
from excess borrowed funds should not
6
trigger deemed sale treatment."
III.

SALE OR LIQUIDATION OF A PARTNERSHIP INTEREST:
TAXING DISTRIBUTIONS AND DISPOSITIONS

A.

Prior Case Law and Regulations

Section 707(a)(2)(B) is intended to ensure that certain transactions are
treated as sales of partnership interests rather than tax-free distributions
under section 731. A sale of a partnership interest and a distribution in
liquidation of a partner's interest may have substantially different tax consequences. For example, section 736 applies to a distribution in redemption
of a partner's interest, but not to a sale of a partnership interest. When a
withdrawing partner receives cash in termination of his interest and the
interests of. the other partners are increased proportionately, a liquidating
distribution is indistinguishable from a sale of the withdrawing partner's
interest to the continuing partners. Subchapter K permits the partners to
choose whether to treat the transaction as a liquidation or as a pro rata sale
of the withdrawing partner's interest to the remaining partners." 7 Because
the economic consequences of the transaction are normally identical, the

115. See ABA § 707 Task Force, supra note 6, at 71-72 (Q&A 92).
116. Id. at 72 (Q&A 93).
117. See, e.g., Cooney v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 101 (1975); Foxman v. Commissioner, 41
T.C. 535 (1964) (acq.), aff'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1965).
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form of the transaction, rather than its "substance," is controlling.118
If the interests of all the other partners are not increased proportionately,
a transaction structured as a liquidation of a partner's interest has all the
indicia of a sale. For example, a withdrawing partner may receive a cash
liquidating distribution coupled with a contribution shortly before or after
by another partner in an amount approximately equal to the liquidating
distribution. Based on section 1.731-1(c)(3) of the regulations, the Service
has argued that related contributions and distributions should be recast as
a sale of a partnership interest between the partners whose interests are
shifted. In amending section 707, Congress sought, in part, to reverse the
result in two cases where taxpayers had successfully avoided treatment of
related contributions-distributions as sales of partnership interests, notwithstanding the regulations.119
In CommunicationsSatellite Corp. v. United States,120 the taxpayer, Comsat, was a member of an international joint venture, INTELSAT, formed
under the auspices of the United Nations to operate a communications
satellite system. The original members of the joint venture, including Comsat,
contributed capital based on their projected use of the system in exchange
for percentage interests or "quotas." The quotas of all existing members
were reduced pro rata to reflect the quota assigned to the new members on
admission. The capital contributions of the new members were set at an
amount approximately equal to what they would have contributed as original
members, adjusted for prior partnership distributions and interest, to avoid
uncertainties in valuing INTELSAT's assets.
The IRS argued that the contribution by the new members, followed shortly
thereafter by a distribution to the old members equal to their share of the
contributed funds, represented a sale of a portion of the existing members'
interests to the new members. 12' The court held, however, that the "substance" of the transaction was a distribution of partnership property to the
existing partners, rather than a sale of partnership interests. 122 In reaching
this decision, the court emphasized the unique character of INTELSAT as
an arrangement for promoting international comity and cooperation.l 23 It
also noted the absence of negotiations between the incoming partners and
the existing members, and any attempt to appraise the value of the partnership interests, as factors not commonly associated with sale transactions.l 2

118. See W. McKEE, supra note 16, 15.02[3].
119. Communications Satellite Corp. v. United States, 625 F.2d 997 (Ct. C1. 1980); Jupiter
Corp. v. United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9168 (CI. Ct. 1983).
120. 625 F.2d 997.
121. Id. at 1000.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1001.
124. Id.
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In Jupiter Corp. v. United States,125 new partners contributed capital and
loaned funds to an existing partnership which used the entire amounts to
repay loans from the original partners and to make distributions to such
partners. The court specifically rejected the government's argument that
section 1.731-1(c)(3) of the regulations required recasting of the contribution
and distribution portions of the transaction as a sale of partnership interests. 126 Focusing on the intent of the parties as the principal distinction
between sale and contribution-distribution treatment, the court indicated that
"[tihe parties must have intended to transfer the partnership interest in the
form in which the transaction is cast. The form of the transaction must
comport with the intention of the parties."' 27 It emphasized that "[t]he
parties had legitimate business reasons for structuring the transaction as they
did. In fact, the goals sought by the parties could not have been achieved
by structuring the transaction as a sale of . . . plaintiff's partnership interest. 1 28 The new partners' interests contained special features, including
limited liability and priority distributions, that could not have been obtained
by a direct sale of the existing general partnership interest. The contribution
form thus enabled the new partners to avoid unlimited liability and permitted
the sole original general partner to retain complete management and control.
Furthermore, the distribution was pro rata to the original partners based on
their pre-contribution interests.
Both CommunicationsSatellite and Jupiter represent unusual cases because
of the closeness in time between the admission of new partners and the
receipt by the old partners of pro rata distributions .nearly equal to the
contributions of the new partners. Although adjustment of the partnership
interests of the old partners contemporaneously with the admission of new
partners may be desirable for bookkeeping purposes, there is often no
business necessity to make immediate distributions to the old partners. As
long as the old partners receive adequate compensation for their disproportionate capital investment in the partnership, a distribution to them to reflect
the altered interests in the partnership can ordinarily be postponed until a
later date. It is correspondingly more difficult to characterize the overall
transaction as a sale of partnership interests if sufficient time elapses between
the contributions and distributions. Classification as a sale of partnership
interests also becomes more tenuous when the distributions to the existing
partners are non-pro rata or occur in installments over a period of time. As
in Jupiter, the inference of a sale of partnership interests can be weakened
when the contribution-distribution results in admission of a new partner with

125. 83-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH)
126. Id. at 86,301.
127. Id. at 86,299.
128. Id. at 86,300.

9168 (C1. Ct. 1983).
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an interest in the partnership different from the existing interests of the
other partners. 29
B.

Legislative Reversal of Communications Satellite
and Jupiter: New Section 707(a)(2)(B)

In amending section 707, Congress sought to prevent contribution-distri1 Thus,
bution treatment in cases like CommunicationsSatellite and Jupiter.30
a contribution and distribution coupled with a liquidation or reduction of
an existing partner's interest will apparently result in sale treatment. Similarly, sale treatment will occur when a contribution by a new partner is
coupled with a pro rata distribution to other partners in partial liquidation
of their partnership interests. However, the effect of amended section
707(a)(2)(B) on the traditional flexibility allowed partners in characterizing
a termination of an existing partner's interest as a section 736 liquidation
or a section 741 sale of a partnership interest is unclear. Although Congress
did not identify such transactions as abusive, the language of section
707(a)(2)(B) is sufficiently broad to encompass them. Even if the disguised
sale rules do not reverse the principle that partners may in effect choose to
be taxed under section 736 or section 741 upon a withdrawal of a partner,
the regulations may well contain anti-abuse provisions.
The legislative history seems to indicate that disguised sale treatment will
depend on whether the source of the distribution is capital contributed by
new partners.'' Assume that equal partnership AB, with a net worth of
$300, admits C as an equal one-third partner in exchange for a cash contribution of $100. Immediately thereafter, the ABC partnership makes a
cash distribution of $50 each to A and B. The contribution and distribution,
when viewed together, will be treated as a sale by A and B of one-third of
their respective 50% partnership interests to C for $50. Disguised sale treatment would apparently not result, however, if the AB partnership made a
$50 pro rata distribution to each of the existing partners from available
partnership cash accumulated prior to the admission of C, even though the
result is economically the same.
A distribution of excess cash from partnership borrowings incurred in
anticipation of the admission of new members will generally trigger disguised
sale treatment. The new partner should be considered to have made an
indirect contribution to the partnership to the extent that such partner's
share of liabilities is increased under section 752.112 For purposes of the
disguised sale provisions, the other partners should be treated as having sold

129.
130.
131.
132.

15.02[3][A].
See W. McKEE, supra note 16,
See Comm. Print, supra note 4, at 225.

Id.
See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 42.
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a portion of their partnership interests to the extent that the constructive
section 752 distribution is accompanied by an actual cash distribution related
to admission of the new partner. 33 For example, assume that the AB partnership borrows $150 in anticipation of C's admission. C would be treated
as having made an indirect contribution of $50 (one-third of the liabilities)
and A and B would each be treated as having received a constructive section
752 distribution of $25 (one-half of the liabilities assigned to C). If the
partnership distributes $50 to A and B each, the portion of the actual cash
distribution treated as deemed sales proceeds will apparently be limited to
$25; in effect, the constructive section 752 distribution represents a "ceiling"
on the recharacterized portion of the distribution. The remaining portion of
the cash distribution, which falls outside section 707, will be taxed under
the normal distribution rules of section 731. Accordingly, A and B may
each avoid deemed sale treatment on a portion of the actual cash distribution,
even though the entire $50 distribution would be treated as deemed sale
proceeds if derived from C's capital contribution rather than partnership
borrowing.
If C's $100 cash contribution is actually used to retire $100 of the partnership's outstanding liabilities pursuant to a prearranged plan, A and B
would each be treated as receiving additional constructive section 752 distributions of $33.33 (one-third of the retired liabilities). Since the total section
752 reduction in partnership liabilities allocable to A and B now exceeds the
amount of actual cash received by them, the entire $50 distribution should
be taxed as disguised sales proceeds. As this example illustrates, the tax
treatment of the distributee partner!Pmay be significantly different depending
on both the source of the actual cash distribution-partnership borrowing
or contributions of other partners-and the eventual use of contributed
capital to retire partnership debt pursuant to a related contribution-distri134
bution.
The order in which partnership debt is incurred and the new member
admitted may also produce radically different tax consequences, even though
the timing of events may often have no independent significance. For example, assume that the AB partnership has no preexisting liabilities at the
time of C's admission, and thereafter borrows $150 and distributes $50 each
to A and B. In this event, the entire $50 cash distribution would apparently
be governed by section 731 rather than section 707, since there is no constructive section 752 distribution. Alternatively, the AB partnership could
incur $100 of liabilities prior to C's admission, distribute $50 of cash each
to A and B, and then incur an additional $50 of partnership liabilities in
conjunction with C's admission. Although this technique would apparently

133. Id.
134. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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suffice to avoid a constructive section 752 distribution, the regulations may
provide anti-avoidance rules to deal with such situations.
Consistent with the legislative intent, disguised sale treatment should not
result from a deemed section 752 distribution unless there is also an actual
35
cash distribution and a change in the partner's interests in the partnership.
If a constructive section 752 distribution were viewed as sufficient by itself
to give rise to deemed sale treatment, virtually any admission of new partners
would trigger application of section 707. It is unlikely, however, that Congress intended to alter the normal rule that the admission of new members
does not constitute a sale or exchange of partnership interests. The section
707 regulations should therefore clarify that a constructive section 752 distribution on admission of new partners will generally not be treated as a
sale or exchange.
Section 707 classification might otherwise cause an inadvertent termination
of the partnership under section 708 because of a constructive section 752
distribution on admission of new partners. Under section 708(b)(1)(B), a
termination of a partnership is triggered by a "sale or exchange" of 50%
or more of the total interests in partnership capital and profits within a
twelve-month period.'36 The section 708 regulations provide generally that
neither the liquidation of a partnership interest by the partnership, nor the
acquisition of a partnership interest by a contribution of property, constitutes
37
a sale or exchange for purposes of section 708(b)(1)(B).'
The section 707 regulations should also clarify the relationship of the
disguised sale rules with the normal rules under section 736 governing payments in liquidation of a retiring partner's interest. Present law appears to
permit partners complete freedom of choice between structuring a payment
to a retiring partner as a section 736 redemption or a section 741 sale of a
partnership interest. 38 Unfortunately, the legislative history offers no guidance concerning the complex interaction between the disguised sale rules of
section 707 and section 736. One approach would be to exempt any purported
section 736 liquidation from the disguised sale rules of section 707, on the
ground that the coexistence of section 736 and section 741 manifests a policy
determination to permit partners to elect non-sale treatment when a partner's
interest in a partnership is retired.
If the regulations instead adopt the position that section 707 may apply
to a purported section 736 liquidation, some exception for constructive
section 752 distributions may, nevertheless, be appropriate. 3 9 For example,
assume that a partner's interest in the partnership is liquidated under section
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See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 42.
I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B) (1986).
Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii) (1987).
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736 in connection with the admission of new members in a transaction which
also triggers a constructive section 752 distribution. If the retiring partner
receives only a deemed distribution of cash, disguised sale treaktment should
not result under the rules discussed above. 40 If the retiring partner receives
both actual cash and a deemed cash distribution, however, it is unclear
whether relief from the disguised sale rules is appropriate.
To avoid the inherent complexity of integrating the already intricate rules
of sections 707, 736, and 752, the regulations may well offer such relief.
Accordingly, the regulations may provide a safe harbor exempting such
transactions from section 707 to the extent that: (1) a distribution is made
pursuant to a section 736 liquidation of a partner's interest and (2) a deemed
sale would otherwise result only by virtue of indirect contributions of other
partners which are deemed to occur under section 752 as a result of a shift
of preexisting liabilities to other partners.' 4' Assuming that the regulations
adopt the proposed safe harbor rule in connection with a liquidation of a
partner's interest under section 736, the question arises whether similar relief
should be provided to any distribution incident to liquidation of a partner's
interest, even if the distribution is not governed by section 736.142 For
example, a general partner may receive some cash and have the balance of
his partnership interest converted into a limited partnership interest in a
transaction that would normally constitute a tax-free exchange of interests
in the same partnership. 41 If the conversion of the general partnership interest
into a limited partnership interest also triggers a constructive section 752
distribution, relief from the disguised sale provisions should arguably be
available to the same extent as if the liquidation of the old general partnership
interest were governed by section 736.
Regardless of the extent to which the section 707 regulations may provide
limited relief in the circumstances described above, they should clarify the
application of section 707 and section 736 in some common situations involving the retirement of a partner's interest in conjunction with the admission of new members. For example, assume that a partnership is formed
with A as sole general partner and A's wholly-owned corporation, X, as the
sole limited partner. A owns 20% and X owns 80% of the partnership
interests. The partnership admits twenty new limited partners who each
contribute $100 and receive a 4% partnership interest. X withdraws as a
partner in return for a cash distribution equal to its original capital contribution plus an additional amount representing interest on X's contributed

140.
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142.
143.
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See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 43-44.
Id.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157 (conversion of general partnership interest
limited partnership interest in the same partnership is a tax-free contribution under
721; gain or loss will be recognized, however, to the extent provided in section 731).
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capital. Since X acted merely to facilitate formation of the partnership and
the cash distribution does not exceed X's original contribution plus interest,
the admission of new partners and withdrawal of X should not be subject
to section 707(a)(2)(B).' 44 If X also receives an additional payment representing an organization or syndication fee as compensation for X's services
4
in forming the partnership, the result should be the same. 1
The regulations should also clarify the potential application of the disguised
sale rules when a partner contributes appreciated property in exchange for
a partnership interest and has a right to withdraw from the partnership in
return for a fixed liquidating distribution. If the partner's right to receive
the liquidating distribution is subject to the risk of the partnership's business,
the liquidating distribution will presumably be treated under the normal rules
of sections 731 and 736. For example, assume that A joins partnership ABC
by contributing an appreciated building, and B and C contribute cash which
the partnership uses to rehabilitate A's building. According to the partnership
agreement, A has the right to withdraw from the partnership when the
rehabilitation is completed and receive a liquidating distribution equal to
twice the value of his original capital contribution. Because the liquidating
distribution to A should generally be viewed as subject to material entrepreneurial risk, section 707 classification as a disguised sale of property or
a partnership interest does not seem appropriate.46
The classification issue is less clear if A has the right to withdraw only
if the partnership is syndicated and a substantial portion of the partnership
interests are sold to new investors. In this situation, section 707(a)(2)(B) may
treat A as having sold his entire partnership interest to new investors, given
Congress' disapproval of the results in CommunicationsSatellite and Jupiter.
To avoid disguised sale treatment, the partners should try to ensure that the
source of the distribution is partnership funds and not capital contributed
by the new investors. 47

IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFERS

A.

Inadequacy of Existing Approach

Consistent with the legislative history, this Article has argued that the
proposed regulations should adopt an approach which reflects the underlying
purpose of section 707(a)(2) as an anti-abuse provision. The disguised sale
provisions are intended to recharacterize certain transactions between a partnership and a partner to reflect their economic substance in situations in
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which the general partnership rules should not apply. Unless the forthcoming
section 707 regulations are narrowly drafted to reflect this anti-abuse purpose,
there is a danger that the disguised sale provisions may be interpreted more
broadly than Congress intended, in a wide range of nonabusive partnerpartnership transactions.
One issue that must be faced squarely is whether detailed regulations
implementing the disguised sale provisions are likely to encounter problems
similar to those under the abortive section 385 debt-equity regulations. 4
The problem of distinguishing debt from equity in the corporate context is
analogous to the difficulties inherent in distinguishing sales from contributions-distributions in the partnership context. Having dodged the task of
providing a statutory distinction between debt and equity in 1954, Congress
decided in 1969 to turn the issue over to the Treasury by enacting section
385.149 It authorized the Treasury to issue regulations defining corporate
stock and debt by reference to factors that might, but need not, be considered
in the section 385 regulations. Although Congress believed that precise statutory definitions were susceptible of circumvention in the debt-equity area,
it failed to explain why regulations might not be frustrated in the same
manner. If the example of the section 385 regulations provides any guidance
to the likely fate of the section 707 regulations, it may be that the Treasury
will prove no more successful than Congress in resolving difficult definitional
issues.
Although the statutory provisions concerning disguised sales were enacted
more than three years ago, no regulations have yet been issued. Given the
inherent difficulty of distinguishing sales from contributions-distributions, it
might be argued that the Treasury should refrain from providing detailed
rules and instead issue merely a prophylactic warning that abusive transactions which resemble sales will be treated accordingly. The difficulty with
this approach, however, is that it has already been tried unsuccessfully.
Consistent with the congressional mandate in the 1984 Act, the Treasury
must therefore address the sale-contribution classification issue, even though
the regulations may be frustrated in practice by the variety and complexity
of partner-partnership transactions.
B.

Immediate Sale Approach

Congress should seriously consider whether alternative approaches to the
treatment of partnership organizational transfers are available to cure the
disguised sale problem. One such approach would be to treat any contribution

148. See N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note 6, at 26.
149. See B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INco E TAXATiON oF CoRPoRAnONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
4.02 (5th ed. 1987).
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to a partnership as an immediate sale event.5 0 Traditionally, section 721
nonrecognition treatment has been justified on the theory that individual
ownership of the property is deemed to continue under an aggregate approach
to partnerships. The contribution of property to a partnership is viewed as
a mere change in the form of ownership, rather than a substantive alteration
in the nature of the underlying investment.' 5' Current law seeks to distinguish
between contributions-distributions which are treated as sales under an entity
approach and those which are treated as tax-free contributions followed by
distributions under an aggregate approach.
If a pure entity approach were taken toward organizational transfers to
a partnership, the contributing partner would be treated as exchanging a
direct ownership interest in the contributed property for a partnership interest. 52 The entity view of organizational transfers would justify treating a
contribution to a partnership as a "partial" or "full" sale of the contributed
property to the other partners. 153 Under a partial sale approach, the contributing partner would be treated as selling only a proportionate interest in
the contributed property to the other partners, and retaining a direct ownership interest in a portion of the contributed property. Under a full sale
approach, the contributing partner would be treated as selling the entire
property to the partnership at its fair market value in exchange for a partnership interest in the partnership's assets. Theoretical consistency requires
imposition of full, rather than partial, sale treatment under an entity ap54
proach. 1
If a partner contributes appreciated property to a partnership and the
other partners contribute solely cash, the transaction strongly resembles a
partial or complete liquidation of the contributed investment and the substitution of a new investment. Immediate sale treatment accurately reflects
the substantive economic alteration in the taxpayer's investment, and avoids
deferral of gain to the contributing partner. Application of an immediate
sale approach in other circumstances, however, may appear excessively harsh.
For example, when two partners each contribute unimproved land to a
partnership in exchange for 50% partnership interests, immediate sale treatment is less clearly justified. A direct exchange of one-half of each partner's

150. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 464-74; Keyser, supra note 8.
151. See Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1498 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C.
767 (1983) (like-kind exchange of property followed immediately by contribution to a partnership
was a change in the form of ownership rather than a relinquishment of ownership).
152. See Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, 779 (1983) (Tannenwald, J., dissenting)
(the "transformation of the [taxpayers'] outright ownership of an interest in real property into
a partnership interest" was a substantive change in the form of investment).
153. See Keyser, supra note 8, at 293 (partial sale approach); Postlewaite, supra note 8, at
465 (full sale approach).
154. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 465-66; Keyser, supra note 8, at 294 (acknowledging
that the logical implication of an entity approach is a full sale model, but opting for a "gentler
rule" in light of practical considerations).
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land for a one-half interest in the other partner's land would normally qualify
as a nonrecognition event under section 1031, subject to the strict boot
recognition rules. 5- In contrast to section 1031, however, section 721 allows
nonrecognition treatment even when the underlying partnership property
includes cash or other non-like-kind property that would trigger boot recognition under section 1031. Thus, the nonrecognition provisions of section
721 are generally more liberal than those of section 1031.156
Although immediate sale treatment may be justified under a strict entity
approach, other policy considerations might require relief from full taxation
of the contributing partner's gain. The nonrecognition provisions of the
Code-including sections 721, 351, and 1031-have traditionally been defended on three grounds: (1) valuation difficulties, (2) lack of liquidity, and
(3) lock-in effect on investments. 57 Valuation difficulties should not be
viewed as an insurmountable objection to immediate sale treatment in the
partnership context, since section 704(c) and the final section 704(b) regulations generally require valuation of contributed property.5 8 In order to
eliminate disparities between book and tax accounts, these rules require that
a partner's capital account be credited with the fair market value, rather
than the transferor's tax basis, of contributed property.
Indeed, the decision in the final section 704(b) regulations to abandon
tax-basis capital accounts as the cornerstone of the economic effect test for
partnership allocations may be traced primarily to the mandatory special
allocation rules of section 704(c) as enacted by the 1984 Act. By contrast,
the proposed section 704(b) regulations promulgated in 1983 established a
general rule that property contributions be booked at their tax basis, rather
than agreed value, except under narrowly defined circumstances. The approach of the proposed regulations was strongly influenced by perceptions
of the opportunities for abuse if partners were permitted to establish capital
accounts, and hence section 704(b) loss allocations, based on an agreed value
of property.'59 This approach was apparently abandoned primarily because
of the enactment of section 704(c), which was aimed at a different kind of
abuse. Although valuation difficulties may still exist, particularly when partners contribute multiple assets to a partnership, the final section 704(b)
regulations thus open the way to an immediate sale approach by requiring
valuation.

155. See I.R.C. § 1031(b) (gain recognized from exchanges not solely of like-kind property).
156. See*Burke, supra note 63, at 491.
157. See Keyser, supra note 8. See also Jensen, The Uneasy Justification for Like-Kind
Exchanges, 4 AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 193, 193-215 (1985) (arguing that justification for like-kind
treatment is "uneasy," but concluding that retention of section 1031 is desirable). Cf. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 397 (1987) (describing
current attitude toward section 1031 as "hero worship").
158. See Keyser, supra note 8, at 292-93.
159. See W. MCKEE, supra note 16,
10.01A[1].
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Objections to an immediate sale approach based on lack of liquidity ignore
the underlying economic reality that a contributing partner has deliberately
chosen to transfer appreciated property to a partnership, thus achieving a
pooling of risks and relinquishing some of the benefits/burdens associated
with the original investment. 16 The ability-to-pay argument also has been
criticized on the ground that it unfairly discriminates against investors who
6
actually liquidate their investment and reinvest the after-tax proceeds. '
Business realities also undermine concerns about lack of liquidity. Several
alternatives would presumably continue to exist whereby the parties could
avoid immediate taxation. 6 2 The putative partner could lease the property
to the partnership or, if efficient operation of the partnership business
required acquisition of the property, the property could be sold to the
partnership under the installment method. In an installment sale, the transferor would be required to recognize gain only in the year in which actual
cash payments were received in proportion to his gross profit ratio. Deferral
of gain recognition would continue, albeit under a Code provision other
than section 721, and the partnership would obtain a stepped-up basis in
the contributed property.
In effect, the partners would be permitted to elect to defer gain under
the installment method or to recognize gain immediately on a taxable contribution. Thus, an immediate sale approach would preserve the substantive
economic distinction between a sale and a contribution based on whether
the other partners are guaranteeing payment for the contributed property
or whether the contributing partner bears a material entrepreneurial risk of
nonpayment. 16 If property is sold on credit to the partnership, the parties
would be required to document the transaction as a sale in order to obtain
the benefit of installment deferral.' 64 If the transfer is structured as a contribution rather than a credit sale, deferral would not be permitted, on the
ground that nonrecognition treatment is incompatible with an entity approach, even though the contribution is admittedly not a sale.
Although critics are likely to object to an immediate sale approach because
of the potential lock-in effect on investments, the lock-in argument is suspect. 16 Imposition of tax on asset conversions necessarily discourages any
switch from a lower to a higher yielding asset, to some extent. Moreover,
preferential treatment of certain transactions as nonrecognition events may
simply encourage conversion of assets into other tax-favored forms which

160. See Keyser, supra note 8, at 288-89.
161. Id. at 290.
162. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 472.
163. Id. at 477 ("the different tax consequences accorded to contributions and sales merely
reflect substantive economic differences" under state partnership law). Cf. Keyser, supra note
8, at 270 (distinction between sales and contributions is "illusory").
164. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 478-79.
165. See Keyser, supra note 8, at 290-91.
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would not be economically justified if imposition of a tax on conversion
were the general income tax rule. Historically, the potential lock-in effect
has been considered sufficiently serious to justify preferential treatment of
capital gains, however. Although this approach is presently in abeyance,
concern about the lock-in effect may warrant rejection of an immediate sale
approach, at least without further intensive rethinking of the direction in
which the income tax should currently be moving. If a consumption tax is
the appropriate model, the current nonrecognition provisions should generally be retained because they point in this direction.'" Aside from speculations concerning the direction of an ideal tax system, however, the
reasons for tentatively rejecting an immediate sale approach can be stated
on narrower grounds, specifically concerning the implications of an immediate sale approach for the existing framework of Subchapter K.
This Article has argued that an immediate sale approach would be attractive precisely because it might lead to a much-needed substantial simplification of the provisions of Subchapter K without introducing any
additional complexities. Under section 704(c) and the final section 704(b)
regulations, valuation of contributed property is required whenever organizational transfers occur upon formation of a partnership. 16 7 The viability
of an immediate sale approach to organizational transfers, however, requires
analysis of its implications for post-formation transfers as well.
The logical implication of a strict entity approach to organizational transfers, when a contribution occurs after formation, would be to treat the
existing partnership as if it had been dissolved and a new partnership had
been formed. 68 Accordingly, the "old" partnership should recognize gain
or loss on appreciated or depreciated partnership property whenever a new
member is admitted. 69 Treatment of post-formation transfers as an immediate recognition event would ensure consistent tax treatment regardless of
whether the new member acquires his partnership interest by "purchase" or
"contribution."' 70 Regardless of the form of the transaction, a strict entity
approach to organizational transactions requires that the admission of a new
member be treated as a full recognition event to both the partnership and
the new member.
For example, assume that A and B initially form a partnership to which
A contributes $6,000 cash and B contributes appreciated land with a basis
of $3,000 and a fair market value of $6,000, in exchange for equal partnership

166. See id. at 283 ("any workable model of a consumption tax would include just such a
principle of nonrecognition"). See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption-Typeor Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HAxv. L. R-v. 1113 (1974).

167. See I.R.C. § 704(c) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d) (1987).
168. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 470.

169. Id.
170. Id.
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interests. Under an immediate sale approach, B must pay tax on the $3,000
gain inherent in the contributed property, and the partnership receives a fair
market value basis in the contributed property. 17' The partnership interests
of A and B will also have a basis equal to fair market value, thereby ensuring
equality between the partners' basis in their partnership interests ("outside
basis") and their share of the partnership's basis in its assets ("inside basis").
Assume further that C is .admitted to the partnership as an equal onethird partner six months later, when the partnership's land has a fair market
value of $12,000, in exchange for a contribution of $9,000 cash. A strict
entity approach to this post-formation transfer would require that partnership
AB recognize $6,000 of gain (allocated $3,000 to A and $3,000 to B) on
admission of C to the new ABC partnership. 172 The ABC partnership would
take a $12,000 basis in the land, and each partner would have a capital
account and tax basis for his partnership interest equal to $9,000, the fair
market value of the partnership interest. This result is proper under a strict
entity approach to organizational issues "because, in essence, the old part73
nership is being dissolved and a new partnership is being formed."'
Rigorous application of a strict entity approach thus requires full and
immediate taxation of all appreciation in partnership assets occurring prior
to the new partner's admission. Even a de minimis contribution of cash or
property by an incoming partner would, in theory, require full gain recognition to the partnership. This result is theoretically proper because partial
gain recognition can only be justified under an aggregate approach, the
antithesis of an entity approach. Predictably, if full gain recognition were
the rule for post-formation transfers, existing partnerships would choose to
raise additional capital for expansion or efficient operation of existing businesses through borrowing, whenever possible, rather than through new
equity infusions, because the former method would be nontaxable while the
latter method would not. Although the corporate tax rules already exhibit
a decided bias in favor of debt as opposed to equity, 74 it is doubtful whether
it is economically desirable to superimpose a similar bias on the partnership
tax rules.
It might be thought possible to avoid this problem by modifying the entity
approach to post-formation transfers when the incoming partner contributes
only a de minimis amount of cash or property, if theoretical consistency
were the only consideration involved. Unfortunately, the problem goes much

171. Id.at 470-71.
172. Id. at 471.
173. Id.
174. Andrews, Tax Neutrality Between Equity Capital and Debt, WAYNE L. REv. 1057-71
(1984). See also ALI, FEDERAL INCOmE TAx PROJECT-SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE
AcQUIsIToNS AND DisPosmoNs AND REPORTER'S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISMJuTrnoNs 330-31,

345, 353-55 and passim (1982).
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deeper, and ultimately reflects the ambivalence with respect to entity-aggregate treatment that pervades Subchapter K. The underlying problem inheres
in the vexing complexities and distortions that arise whenever a partner's
outside basis differs from his share of the partnership's inside basis. A strict
entity approach to organizational transfers has the potential to simplify
Subchapter K significantly by eliminating the possibility of a discrepancy
between inside and outside basis. 175 Under an immediate sale approach,
equality of inside and outside basis is automatically established at the price
of immediate taxation of unrealized appreciation inherent in contributed
property.
Unless post-formation transfers are treated with the same rigor as formation transfers, however, the initial equality between inside and outside
basis will break down. The reason is that a contribution to an existing
partnership with appreciated property is really the equivalent of a formation
of a new partnership to which the existing partners contribute the old
partnership's appreciated property and the incoming partner contributes
other property. The final section 704(b) regulations recognize this equivalence
by requiring so-called "reverse section 704(c) allocations" whenever a new
member is admitted to an existing partnership owning property with a tax
basis other than its fair market value at the time of contribution.1 76 Although
reverse section 704(c) allocations are expressly governed by the final section
704(b) regulations, rather than by section 704(c) itself, the results are generally
identical. Therefore, unless post-formation transfers are treated as triggering
full gain recognition to the existing partnership, resulting disparities between
book and tax accounts can be eliminated only by retention of rules analogous
to present section 704(c).
Accordingly, full recognition of gain on post-formation transfers is essential to achieve potential simplification of Subchapter K in the form of a
repeal of present section 704(c) without reintroducing the abuses at which
section 704(c) is aimed. The egregious complexities produced under present
Subchapter K by the interplay of the aggregate approach of section 704(c)
and the entity approach of the so-called "ceiling rule," have been explored
at length elsewhere. 77 An immediate sale approach offers an opportunity to
eliminate these distortions because it recognizes the separate entity character
of partnerships in the context of organizational transfers. Indeed, the immediate sale approach is one of the cornerstones of a recent comprehensive
7
critique of the aggregate view taken by the ALI in its Subchapter K project.'

175. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 479.
176. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-I(b)(5) Example 14 (1987) (restatement of partners' capital
account or, alternatively, special allocation of pre-contribution gain required when new partners
admitted).
177. See Marich & McKee, supra note 32.
178. See Postlewaite, supra note 8.
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The ALI project took "as a basic assumption" that, "in the absence of
countervailingfactors,1 ' 79 partners should ideally be treated as if they were
conducting a proportionate share of the partnership's business. Thus, the
ALI project sought to assimilate the partnership model as nearly as possible
to a pure aggregate approach, recommending entity-based rules only in those
situations in which an aggregate approach would lead to undue complexity
or potential abuse. The recent critique of the ALI project abandons the
underlying aggregate model of partnership taxation and proceeds instead
8°
from a "transaction oriented perspective."'
Although this conceptual critique of the ALI's aggregate model has considerable analytical force and potential for simplification of Subchapter K,
this Article has suggested that an entity view of organizational transfers
raises serious lock-in problems. To achieve its intended purpose, the entity
approach must necessarily be applied to both formation and post-formation
transfers. Even if the lock-in problem is viewed as manageable with respect
to formation transfers, an immediate sale approach should be rejected with
respect to post-formation transfers because of the more serious lock-in problems arising when an existing partnership with appreciated property admits
new members. If an immediate sale approach is not feasible with respect to
post-formation transfers, however, it should not be applied to formation
transfers either.
C.

Deferred Sale Approach

If the price of simplification of Subchapter K through imposition of an
immediate sale approach is excessively high, more modest solutions to the
disguised sale problem must be sought. One approach would be to seek
perfection of the section 707 regulations. However, as this Article illustrates,
perfection of such regulations will not be an easy task; and it may not be
unreasonably pessimistic to speculate that the section 707 regulations, when
finally issued, may suffer the fate of the abortive section 385 regulations.
Fortunately, there is a less radical alternative to an immediate sale approach
which is feasible, consistent with the present nonrecognition policy of section
721 and the goal of simplicity: namely, a "deferred sale" approach. Although a deferred sale approach can cure the disguised sale problem, it
should be implemented only in conjunction with a rationalization of the
distribution rules of Subchapter K.
A "deferred sale" approach to organizational transfers was originally
proposed by the ALI study of Subchapter K. 1 1Although the ALI ultimately

179. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 5 (emphasis added).
180. Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 426.
181. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 129-31.
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decided to reject the deferred sale approach, it did so on grounds that such
an approach would lead to additional complexity and valuation difficulties.'8
More recently, the deferred sale approach has been revived as a proposed
optional or mandatory cure for existing complexities attributable to the
interaction of section 704(c) and the ceiling rule.13 The deferred sale approach
reflects essentially an aggregate approach, but is sensitive to ceiling rule
problems resulting from the entity approach to determinations of depreciation
and gain or loss at the partnership level. 84 Accordingly, the deferred sale
approach should no longer be viewed as a source of additional complexity,
but rather as a cure to existing complexities caused by the ceiling rule
limitation on section 704(c) allocations. 8 5 Moreover, the valuation difficulties
feared by the ALI are already present under section 704(c) and the final
section 704(b) regulations. 8 6 Therefore, the ALI's original grounds for rejecting the deferred sale approach-additional complexity and valuation difficulties-are no longer controlling. Rather, the deferred sale approach offers
hope for restoring coherence to Subchapter K.
The ALI recognized that a deferred sale or "credited value" approach
"permits the simplicity and correctness of result that are available if the
formation of a partnership is treated as taxable," but achieves these benefits
"without

. .

.the deterrent effect on partnership formation that will result

if gain is immediately recognized.' 8 7 Under the "partial" deferred sale
approach as originally recommended by the ALI, the contributing partner
would be treated as though, at the time of contribution, he had sold an
undivided portion of the contributed property, but recognition of gain or
loss would be deferred.'88 This version of the deferred sale approach is
potentially complex, however, because it would be necessary to keep track
of each partner's separate basis in the contributed property. 8 9 The noncontributing partners would acquire a cost basis in the contributed property,
while the contributing partner would have a carryover basis in the retained
portion. More recently, in 1984, the ALI proposed a simpler alternative
referred to as a "full" deferred sale approach. 190 Although the full deferred"
sale approach has been objected to as a modification of a strict aggregate

182. Id. at 129.

183. Marich & McKee, supra note 32, at 682-87.
184. Id. at 684.

185. Id. at 686 (deferred sale approach "could provide the tonic for a source of truly
distressing complexity, the ceiling rule").
186. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
187. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 129.
188. ALI FEDAL INCOME STATUTE 354 at 354-56 (Feb. 1954 Draft); Marich & McKee, supra
note 32, at 682.
189. See Marich & McKee, supra note 32, at 683.
190. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 129.
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approach,' 9' it actually represents merely a "simpler, more flexible means
of implementing a deferred sale approach."' 192 On grounds of simplicity and
workability, therefore, the full deferred sale approach should be adopted
rather than the partial deferred sale approach.
Under the full deferred sale approach, the contributing partner would be
treated as if he had sold the contributed property to the partnership at its
fair market value. The partnership would receive a basis in the contributed
property equal to its fair market value, and deferred gain or loss would be
allocated to the contributing partner based on the difference between the
basis and fair market value of the property at the time of contribution.' 93
Consistent with the underlying nonrecognition policy of section 721, the full
deferred sale approach would postpone recognition of the contributing partner's gain or loss until the partnership disposed of the property or the
partner disposed of his partnership interest.'1' In the case of depreciable
property, a portion of the contributing partner's deferred gain or loss would
be recognized each year over the remaining depreciable life of the property.' 95
By requiring the contributing partner to bear the benefits/burdens of any
disparity between the basis and fair market value of the contributed property,
the full deferred sale approach would effectively implement the underlying
goal of section 704(c). It would also rectify distortions caused by the ceiling
rule limitation on section 704(c) allocations, thereby restoring equality between inside and outside basis.'9
Deferral of gain on contributed property would continue as under present
section 721, but recognition of gain would be accelerated to the extent that
the contributing partner would effectively be allocated a larger stream of
taxable income until any book-tax disparity is entirely eliminated. If a contributing partner's interest in the partnership is reduced through a non-pro
rata distribution, such as a disguised payment for contributed property, the
distribution would be treated as triggering deferred gain to the extent of.the
percentage reduction in the partner's partnership interest. This result is proper
because a non-pro rata distribution can be viewed as a partial or complete
liquidation of a partnership interest, and is economically equivalent to a sale
of a portion of the underlying partnership assets in which the distributee's

interest is terminated. I9

191. N.Y. Bar Comments, supra note .6,
at 12 n.5 (full deferred sale treats the contributing
partner as selling a portion of the property to himself or treats the partnership as if it were
an entity rather than an aggregate).
192. Marich & McKee, supra note 32, at 684.
193. ALI TAx PROTECT, supra note 6, at 129.

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Marich & McKee, supra note 32, at 686.
197. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 594-611.
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Under a deferred sale approach, similar results would obtain whenever a
new partner is admitted to an existing partnership with appreciated prop"
erty. 98
' The ALI recognized that, if a deferred sale approach were adopted
for property contributions on formation of a partnership, it would be "desirable to apply a parallel rule when a new partner is admitted to an existing
partnership, even if the only asset he contributes is cash."' 1 Otherwise,
deferred sale treatment could be avoided under some circumstances simply
by "placing property in a partnership before economically significant further
admissions to the partnership. ' ' 200 The ALI considered that application of
a deferred sale approach to post-formation transfers, however, "could become exceedingly complex, especially for partnerships with a number of
partners and many appreciated and depreciated properties. ' ' 20 ' These concerns should no longer be viewed as an obstacle to adoption of a full deferred
sale approach. By requiring reverse section 704(c) allocations whenever property is contributed to an existing partnership with appreciated or depreciated
property, the final section 704(b) regulations facilitate a full deferred sale
approach to post-formation transfers.
When property is contributed to an ongoing partnership, the existing
partners would be treated as if they had made a fresh contribution of the
old partnership's property to a new partnership. Any unrealized gain inherent
in the old partnership's property would continue to be deferred under principles analogous to present section 721, and would be allocated to the old
partners in accordance with section 704(c) principles. A non-pro rata distribution to the existing partners would trigger a proportionate amount of
the deferred gain. Again, this result is proper because a contribution-distribution on admission of new members is economically equivalent to a sale
of a portion of the existing partners' partnership interests to the new partners,
and should be taxed accordingly. 20 2
The deferred sale approach outlined above should be implemented, however, only in conjunction with further reform of the partnership distribution
rules. The existing distribution rules offer opportunities for abuse, quite
apart from the disguised sale problem perceived by Congress. Partners are
effectively permitted under the general rules of Subchapter K to elect between
treating a terminating distribution to a partner as a liquidation under section
736 or a sale under section 741, with radically different tax consequences. 203
This ability to elect tax consequences is unjustified, since a complete liqui-

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6,at 136.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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dation of a partner's interest in the partnership is economically equivalent
to a sale of that interest to the existing partners.
In its study of Subchapter K, the ALI proposed a "full-fragmentation"
approach to all cash distributions which result in a complete termination of
a partner's interest in a partnership. 2 4 Under the full-fragmentation approach, a liquidation of a partner's interest would be taxed equivalently to
a sale of a partnership interest. A liquidation or sale would each trigger
gain recognition at the partnership and partner levels respectively, as if a
portion of the partnership property had been sold*and the proceeds distributed to the partner disposing of his interest in those assets. 20 s The ALI
considered that the full-fragmentation approach represented a simpler method
of evaluating a sale of a partnership interest than the existing collapsible
partnership rules of section 751, and would therefore be "much more likely
to be applied in practice."' ' The collapsible partnership rules are intended
to prevent the parties from converting ordinary gain from unrealized receivables and substantially appreciated inventory into capital gain. When the
collapsible partnership rules were enacted in 1954, this limited fragmentation
of the proceeds from sale of a partnership interest was intended to minimize
the need to value most partnership assets. 2°0 Because of the expansion of
ordinary income assets subject to section 751 treatment, however, it is generally impossible to avoid a detailed asset valuation when a partnership
interest is sold. The collapsible partnership rules of section 751 therefore no
longer accomplish their original goal, and add considerably to the complexity
of Subchapter K.
The ALI proposals would repeal most of section 736, but continue to
preserve the option of section 736(a) treatment for goodwill payments to
general partners in partnerships in which capital is not a material-income
producing factor. 250 Although outright repeal of section 736 may be preferable, the conversion and timing problems may be viewed as less serious
in the case of primarily service partnerships where retirement payments are
likely to be attributable to deductible unrealized receivables. In capitalintensive partnerships, the ALI perceived that the existing rules of section
736 were subject to manipulation by permitting the parties to determine
whether payments attributable to partnership goodwill should be taxed as

204. See ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 40-41 (recommending that cash liquidating
distributions in termination of a partner's interest be treated as a sale of a partnership interest
under a "full-fragmentation" approach).

205. Id.at 40-41.
206. Id.at 23. See also id. at 51-55.
207. Id.at 23.
208. Id.at 66 (repeal of most of section 736, with exception for payments to general partners
in partnerships in which capital is not a material income-producing factor).
209. Postlewaite, supranote 8, at 614-15 (outright repeal of section 736, with special provision
for payments from a legitimate retirement benefit fund).
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capital gain under section 736(b) or as ordinary income under section 736(a). 210
If the parties agree to section 736(a) treatment, the payments are deductible
by the partnership under section 162(a) and excluded from the other partners'
distributive share of partnership income. Prior to the 1986 Act, the advantage
of an immediate deduction to the partnership for goodwill payments was at
least offset by ordinary income treatment to the retiring partner. Both the
partnership and the distributee partner could generally improve their aftertax positions, however, if the distributee agreed to treat the goodwill payments under section 736(a) as ordinary income in exchange for a larger
payment.2 ' The 1986 Act has exacerbated this problem by the repeal of
preferential treatment for capital gains.
Although complete liquidations and sales of partnership interests would
generally be subject to the full-fragmentation approach, the ALI proposals
would continue to preserve nonrecognition treatment for non-liquidating
distributions and liquidating distributions of non-cash property. 2 2 Nonrecognition treatment of current distributions which do not alter the partners'
interests in the partnership should generally be retained. The rationale for
granting nonrecognition treatment to current distributions is that such distributions represent merely the receipt of partnership earnings previously
taxed to the partners as a portion of their distributive share of partnership
profits or a return of the partner's capital. 213 This rationale, however, cannot
serve to justify nonrecognition treatment of non-pro rata distributions which
reflect a shift in the partners' interests in the partnership. Deferral of gain
or loss inherent in the distributee's share of partnership assets should not
be permitted for a non-pro rata distribution, since the distributee has effectively terminated his interest in a portion of the partnership's underlying
214
assets and should be taxed accordingly.
Despite the theoretical justification for treating complete liquidations and
non-pro rata distributions alike, the ALI rejected the full-fragmentation
approach for non-pro rata distributions. This decision was most likely influenced by a desire to avoid additional complexity that would result from
the application of the full-fragmentation approach when the distributee partner retains a reduced interest in the partnership. If a partner's interest in
the partnership is only partially terminated, severe computational problems
may arise in determining the portion of the interest which has been relinquished. These problems are exacerbated in partnerships using complex profit
and loss sharing ratios, although the valuation rules are identical. 21 5 This is

210. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 59-62.
211. See W. McKEE, supra note 16, 22.04[4].
212. ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 31-36.
213. See Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 597.
214. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
215. See ALI TAx PROJECT, supra note 6, at 44 (computation of partner's proportionate
interest).
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because the full-fragmentation approach to partial liquidations requires a
comparison of the distributee's pro rata interest in the individual partnership
assets immediately prior to the distribution, with the distributee's retained
pro rata interest in the individual partnership assets immediately after the
distribution. These computational problems are essentially analogous to those
arising under the present collapsible partnership rules of section 751 when
there is a shift in the partners' interests in ordinary income and capital gain
assets.

216

The ALI's distribution proposals, however, were premised on the existence
of a "simpler" model of partnership taxation in which the complexities of
present section 704(c) and the final section 704(b) regulations were not
operative. Under the present regime, more thoroughgoing reform of the
distribution rules should not be rejected solely on grounds of additional
complexity. Under section 704(b), partnership assets must generally be revalued whenever a liquidating or a non-liquidating distribution occurs, and
the partners' interests in the partnership must be redetermined to reflect
accurately the effect of a distribution on capital accounts. 217 Indeed, the
final section 704(b) regulations warn that a failure to restate capital accounts
to reflect the fair market value of partnership assets, or to achieve a similar
result through special allocation of gain or loss upon the acquisition or
relinquishment of a partnership interest, may have substantial adverse con218
sequences.
Given the present framework of section 704(c) and the section 704(b)
regulations, the ALI's decision to preserve the existing distribution rules for
non-pro rata distributions deserves critical re-examination, as does the ALI's
rejection of the deferred sale approach on grounds of additional complexity
and valuation difficulties. Since the valuation problems are already present
under the final section 704(b) regulations, what was once viewed as a source
of additional complexity may now be perceived as an opportunity to rationalize Subchapter K. The issue is undoubtedly a difficult one, and should
perhaps be resolved on grounds of practicality rather than mere theoretical
consistency. If the present distribution rules are a source of potential abuse,
as seems likely, more thoroughgoing rationalization should be pursued, especially if this can be achieved without adding appreciably to existing complexities.
This Article's proposed distribution rules would require line-drawing between non-pro rata distributions which result in a shift in the partners'
interests in the partnership and a series of non-pro rata distributions which
in the aggregate leave the partners' interests in the partnership unchanged. 219
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Although such line-drawing would impose some additional complexity, administratively workable solutions are feasible. 220 If a series of non-pro rata
distributions yields a result that is pro rata in the aggregate, nonrecognition
treatment should generally be available under the rule for current distributions. An administrative rule might provide that current distribution treatment applies to a series of non-pro rata distributions only to the extent that
the partners have received an equivalent amount of partnership property by
the end of the partnership's taxable year or within a short period thereafter.-,
Any excess portion of the distribution would be treated as a partial liquidation of the non-pro rata recipient's partnership interest, subject to rec222
ognition of gain or loss.
CONCLUSION

In enacting the disguised sale provisions, Congress sought to prevent
taxpayers from treating transactions which closely resemble sales of property
or partnership interests as tax-free contributions-distributions. Recently, one
commentator has suggested that the Committee Reports on the disguised
sale provisions of the 1984 Act are "masterpieces of dissimulation and
vagueness,' '22 based on the argument that the distinction between sales and
contributions is "illusory. ' 224 This Article has criticized the 1984 Act provisions on quite different conceptual grounds.
First, the Article has set forth possible regulatory approaches consistent
with the anti-abuse purpose of the disguised sale provisions and Congress'
underlying assumption that the sale-contribution dichotomy represents substantive economic differences. The essence of the economic distinction between a contribution and a sale is whether the contributing partner bears a
material entrepreneurial risk of nonpayment or whether the other partners
are, in effect, guaranteeing payment to the contributing partner for the
contributed property. Congress granted broad regulatory authority to the
Treasury in implementing section 707 to ensure that tax consequences should
generally follow these economic distinctions.
Second, the Article has indicated that the classification issues are conceptually difficult because the disguised sale provisions do not necessarily mesh
well with the general provisions of Subchapter K which Congress did not
intend to alter. Because the section 707 regulations may suffer from infirmities similar to those of the abortive section 385 regulations, the Article
has explored alternative approaches to organizational transfers. These alter-
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native approaches are premised on the assumption that policy considerations
may justify immediate or deferred sale treatment of organizational transfers
in the interest of simplification and rationalization of Subchapter K.
Third, the Article has advocated that a deferred sale approach be implemented in conjunction with proposed reforms in the distribution rules of
Subchapter K. The reasons for linking the two proposals are twofold. On
the one hand, unless the distribution proposals for liquidating and non-pro
rata distributions are adopted, the deferred sale approach cannot offer a
fully effective cure for existing abuses such as the disguised sale problem.
On the other hand, the distribution proposals can operate effectively and
simply only if the deferred sale approach to formation and post-formation
transfers is adopted. Stated differently, the disguised sale problem is both
a contribution and a distribution problem that can be fully resolved only
through application of analytically consistent rules that address both the
contribution and distribution ends of the spectrum.
The underlying approach to contribution-distribution problems set forth
in this Article reflects a blend of entity and aggregate principles. This approach is consistent with the ALI's fundamental assumption that the ideal
partnership model should conform as nearly as possible to pure aggregate
principles, in the absence of countervailing factors. The Article's proposals
build upon the analytical framework of the ALI's project on Subchapter K,
but are also strongly influenced by the recent comprehensive critique of the
ALI's study. Although that critique would adopt an entity-based immediate
sale approach to organizational transfers, this Article has concluded that a
deferred sale approach can reach substantially identical results. This conclusion rests on the premise that the deferred sale approach is essentially identical
to an immediate sale approach, except that it avoids the deterrent effect on
partnership formation and post-formation transfers.
Despite their differing conceptual premises, the underlying goal of both
the immediate sale and deferred sale approaches are substantially identical:
Both seek simplification and rationalization of Subchapter K. The case for
abandoning or modifying the aggregate model in future reform of Subchapter
K must be made in light of what the aggregate model can or cannot accomplish, consistent with these goals. Ultimately, the choice between the
deferred sale and immediate sale approach may rest largely upon perceptions
concerning the ideal model of partnership taxation.

